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I. INTRODUCTION 
Long after a person recovers physically, illness and injury can have a 
significant financial impact on individuals and their families.  In the past 
several years, the news media have given front-page attention to the money 
side of medical problems.  Featured stories described how big hospital bills 
turn families’ lives upside down, sometimes costing them their homes, their 
credit ratings, access to their bank accounts, and occasionally even their lib-
erty.1  These stories could have been an important catalyst for discussion of 
how the structure of the current health care finance system produces signifi-
cant financial consequences for patients and their families.  So far, however, 
the conversation mainly has taken a different and narrower path:  these pa-
tients and their families suffered, the public has been told, because hospitals 
misbehaved.  Lawmakers and advocates focused on allegations that hospi-
tals overcharged the uninsured, improperly applied charity care policies, 
and engaged in inappropriate debt collection.2  Proposed solutions focused, 
in turn, on suing hospitals and regulating hospital billing and collection 
with respect to the low-income uninsured.3  We refer to this approach 
throughout this Article as the “hospital misbehavior model.” 
The hospital misbehavior model has had some short-term utility.  By 
examining the intersection of health care finance and debtor-creditor law 
and policy, however, it becomes clear that tinkering with the collection ac-
tivities of hospitals will not substantially reduce medical-related financial 
distress or the entanglement between medical problems and the debtor-
creditor system.    
Using data on individual bankruptcy filers—a cross-section of middle-
class households—we observe that the hospital misbehavior model inade-
quately accounts for the financial distress that can accompany medical 
problems.  First, the hospital misbehavior model has focused on people with 
a chronic lack of insurance, but even the insured face significant medical-
related indebtedness.4  Second, hospital bills are only part of a larger picture 
of direct medical costs that also includes office visits, prescription drugs, 
and other expenses.5  Third, medical bills readily are converted into con-
sumer debt that is owed to third-party lenders; in those situations, hospitals 
will not be the direct creditor of the patient or family members.6  Fourth, 
lost income often is a major component of medical-related financial dis-
tress, with hospital bills or other direct costs playing a much more limited 
role.7   
 
1  See infra notes 12–20 and accompanying text. 
2  See infra notes 28–32, 54–58 and accompanying text. 
3  See infra notes 33–53 and accompanying text. 
4  See infra Part III.B. 
5  See infra Part III.C. 
6  See infra Part III.D. 
7  See infra Part III.E. 
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We cannot quantify precisely the extent to which bankruptcy filers’ 
medical-related financial problems can be linked to hospital misbehavior 
alone.  In addition, bankruptcy filers as a group may differ somewhat from 
the patients highlighted in discussions of hospital misbehavior.8  Nonethe-
less, we conclude that the problem is largely structural and not behavioral.  
The data suggest that a variety of households are struggling with far more 
pervasive financial fallout than can be attributed solely to hospital debt col-
lection activities.  Legal and policy solutions to alleged hospital misbehav-
ior are likely to bring very limited relief.   
In addition, although we cannot speak to whether not-for-profit hospi-
tals have misbehaved from the perspective of tax exemption entitlements, 
we can report that the hospitals’ collection activities are not extraordinary in 
the debtor-creditor world.9  Our health care system is premised intentionally 
on legal liability for part or all of the cost of medical care.  Collection-
related consequences flow from defaulting on obligations to pay for medi-
cal goods or services, like any other legal obligation.  Indeed, a patchwork 
of laws give medical providers extra debt collection powers and incentives 
to use them.10  Inconsistent public policies are at work when lawmakers 
chastise hospitals for pursuing debts while they provide incentives and spe-
cial powers for hospitals to do exactly that.  
To achieve meaningful reform, health policymakers should relax the 
focus on individual wrongdoing and instead consider how the structure of 
the health care finance system, broadly construed to include the laws dis-
cussed in this Article, contributes to significant financial distress of patients 
and their families.11  In addition, the negative public reaction to hospital 
debt collection should prompt debtor-creditor policymakers to question 
whether our current debt collection system is inefficient, unfair, or both as 
applied to consumer indebtedness generally.  Even if lawmakers pursue 
more targeted interventions, however, they should develop their proposals 
in light of the data and existing relevant laws we have presented here.  
In Part II, we briefly describe the news media account and the nature of 
the proposed and implemented responses.  In Part III, we evaluate bank-
ruptcy data to explore the mismatch between the hospital misbehavior 
model and medical-related financial distress among this population.  In Part 
IV, we place allegations of hospital misbehavior into a broader context of 
debtor-creditor law.  In Part V, we make general recommendations for fu-
ture study and action.  
 
8  See infra notes 69–72 and accompanying text. 
9  See infra Part IV. 
10  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
11  See infra Part V. 
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II. CONSTRUCTING THE PROBLEM OF HOSPITAL MISBEHAVIOR 
In a series of investigative reports, former patients, financially devas-
tated by aggressive hospital collection, emerged on the public’s radar 
screen.  The reporting, including prominently featured Wall Street Journal 
stories, showed what happened when people got sick, received high-priced 
medical care, and were unable to pay on the terms the hospitals required.  
Their wages were garnished,12 their homes were liened,13 and their bank ac-
counts were frozen.14  They entered into payment plans that would last for 
years as interest compounded regularly.15  Reporters amplified these exam-
ples with statistics on hospital lawsuits and liens, suggesting widespread 
impropriety.16  The stories highlighted some patients who even landed in jail 
when they were sued for nonpayment of their hospital bills and failed to 
comply with court orders.17  Each story had a victim, but the main attraction 
of this reporting was the villain:  a large and impersonal hospital.  Hospitals 
did at least three things wrong, according to these reports.  They charged 
uninsured patients a higher price than most insured patients and their insur-
ers pay.18  They billed patients who perhaps should have been eligible for 
charity care.19  And they engaged in aggressive debt collection to recover 
these sums.20   
 
12  See, e.g., Jonathan Cohn, Uncharitable?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, at 51. 
13  See, e.g., Liz Kowalczyk, Hospital Using Liens to Collect from Patients, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 
17, 2004, at A1; Cullen Browder, Wake Woman May Lose Home to Cover Late Husband’s Medical 
Bills:  Hospital Hopes to Work Toward Amicable Settlement, WRAL.COM, July 12, 2004, 
http://www.wral.com/news/3522117/detail.html. 
14  See, e.g., Lucette Lagnado, Cold-Case Files:  Dunned for Old Bills, Poor Find Some Hospitals 
Never Forget, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2004, at A1. 
15  See, e.g., Lucette Lagnado, Jeanette White is Long Dead but Her Hospital Bill Lives on:  Interest 
Charges, Legal Fees, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2003, at B1 (owing $40,000 on a bill to Yale-New Haven 
Hospital that was originally $18,000 due to ten percent interest). 
16  See, e.g., Marsha Austin, Uninsured Pay Higher Price:  Hospital Collection Agents Demand Full 
Cost of Care, DENV. POST, Jan. 28, 2003, at 1A (noting that hospitals in area have sued at least 210 in-
dividuals for unpaid medical bills of $2000 or more in the past two years, and twenty-four percent of the 
cases are for bills of $10,000 or more); Jodie Snyder, Hospitals Try to Get Bills Fully Paid by Cashing 
in on Patients’ Settlements, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Phoenix), Aug. 31, 2003, at A22 (finding 35,000 liens filed 
against patients by hospitals in two-year period, most of which were on accident lawsuits or settle-
ments).  
17  See, e.g., Medical Seizures:  Hospitals Try Extreme Measures to Collect Their Overdue Debt—
Patients Who Skip Hearings on Bills Are Arrested, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2003, at A1. 
18  See, e.g., Julie Appleby, Hospitals Sock Uninsured with Much Bigger Bills, USA TODAY, Feb. 
25, 2004, at 1B; Lucette Lagnado, Anatomy of a Hospital Bill:  Uninsured Patients Often Face Big 
Markups on Small Items, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2004, at B1; Lucette Lagnado, House Panel Begins In-
quiry into Hospital Billing Practices, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2003, at B1 [hereinafter Lagnado, House 
Panel].  
19  See, e.g., Lucette Lagnado, Call it Yale v. Yale:  Law-School Clinic is Taking Affiliated Hospital 
to Court over Debt-Collection Tactics, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2003, at B1 [hereinafter Lagnado, Call it 
Yale v. Yale]; Lucette Lagnado, New York State Hospitals Agree to Cut Prices for Uninsured, WALL ST. 
J., Feb. 2, 2004, at B1 [hereinafter Lagnado, New York State Hospitals]. 
20  See, e.g., Lagnado, supra note 15. 
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The news stories, supplemented by efforts of advocacy groups, 
prompted legislative and legal responses that themselves became a news 
story.21  The media covered a congressional committee’s formal investiga-
tion of hospital practices,22 scrutiny of tax exemptions,23 government “scold-
ing” of hospitals,24 proposed legislation,25 lawsuits,26 and the hospital 
industry’s self-policing efforts.27  Like the media reporting, these responses 
targeted the named villains:  the hospitals.  At a House committee investiga-
tive hearing, the committee chair insisted that the inquiry be focused on 
hospital overcharging and aggressive collection with respect to uninsured 
patients and rejected efforts of other lawmakers to broaden the discussion.28  
Allegations of bad behavior helped fuel scrutiny of not-for-profit hospitals’ 
tax exempt status29 and reignited a recurring debate over the propriety of tax 
exemptions.30  In dozens of lawsuits, the plaintiffs contended that not-for-
 
21  For an example of a commentator linking the news coverage with public and lawmaker reaction, 
see, for example, Lawrence Singer, Gloria Jean Ate Catfood Tonight:  Justice and the Social Compact 
for Health Care in America, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 613, 627 n.78 (2005). 
22  See, e.g., Joanne Kenen, U.S. House Panel Examines High Bills for Uninsured, REUTERS NEWS, 
June 24, 2004; Lagnado, House Panel, supra note 18; Politics & Policy:  The Uninsured:  Hospital Ex-
ecutives Testify on Billing Practices, AM. HEALTH LINE, June 25, 2004, 
http://www.americanhealthline.com/index.html. 
23  See, e.g., Lucette Lagnado, Hospital Found ‘Not Charitable’ Loses its Status as Tax Exempt, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2004, at B1; Lucette Lagnado, A Nonprofit Hospital Fights to Win Back Charita-
ble Halo, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2004, at B1; see also Gary Washburn, Assessor Pushed to Tax Hospital:  
Aldermen Back Union’s Side on Resurrection, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 3, 2004, at 1. 
24  See, e.g., Lucette Lagnado, HHS Chief Scolds Hospitals for Their Treatment of Uninsured, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 20, 2004, at A1. 
25  See, e.g., Lucette Lagnado, Taming Hospital Billing; Lawmakers Push Legislation to Curb Ag-
gressive Collection Against Uninsured Patients, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2003, at B1. 
26  See, e.g., Reed Abelson & Jonathan D. Glater, Suits Challenge Hospital Bills of Uninsured, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 17, 2004, at C1; Cohn, supra note 12 (listing suits naming more than 400 nonprofit hospi-
tals); Lagnado, Call it Yale v. Yale, supra note 19; Lawsuits Challenge Charity Hospitals on Care for 
Uninsured, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2004, at B1. 
27  See, e.g., Bruce Japsen, Hospitals Soften Billing Pain:  Industry Agrees to Offer Discounts, Tem-
per Harsh Collection Practices, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 2, 2003, at C1; Lucette Lagnado, Hospitals Urged to 
End Harsh Tactics for Billing Uninsured, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2003, at A9; Lagnado, New York State 
Hospitals, supra note 19; Lucette Lagnado, Twenty Years—And He Isn’t Paying Any More, WALL ST. J, 
Apr. 1, 2003, at B1 [hereinafter Lagnado, Twenty Years—And He Isn’t Paying Any More].  
28  See generally A Review of Hospital Billing and Collections Practices:  Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 4 
(2004) [hereinafter Hearing on Hospital Billing and Collections].   
29  See, e.g., Patrick Reilly, Indigent-Care Spending Low, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Feb. 23, 2004, at 7 
(reporting on revocation of tax exemption); Washburn, supra note 23 (citing letter from city council 
members seeking revocation because of “steep decline in charity care, implementation of restrictive 
charity care policies and aggressive collection procedures, including lawsuits against poor patients”).  
For a report considering a wider range of considerations, see Neville M. Bilimoria, Patients Challenge 
Nonprofit Hospitals’ Charitable-Care Practices, 93 ILL. B.J. 134, 137 (2005). 
30  See, e.g., Gabriel O. Aitsebaomo, The Nonprofit Hospital:  A Call for New National Guidance 
Requiring Minimum Annual Charity Care to Qualify for Federal Tax Exemption, 26 CAMPBELL L. REV. 
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profit hospitals breached an implied contract with the government, engaged 
in “profiteering,” and inappropriately tried to collect debts.31  Plaintiffs even 
have alleged that hospitals engaged in deceptive trade practices.32 
The clearest example of a response to the misbehavior model can be 
found in Connecticut.  Shortly after detailed reports emerged of the billing 
and collection practices used at Yale-New Haven Hospital and other local 
hospitals, Connecticut lawmakers enacted new laws to protect patients from 
these hospital practices.33  The laws impose a new process for Connecticut 
hospitals to follow when billing and collecting from “uninsured patients,” a 
defined term that depends on both income and lack of eligibility for gov-
ernment programs.34  They require that the hospital first assess whether a 
patient meets that definition.35  If the patient qualifies, the hospital may not 
collect more than the cost of providing services.36  In addition, the hospital’s 
collection agents must notify the patient of her status while trying to collect 
that amount.37  They also must provide patients with a summary of their 
hospital bed fund information.38   
The new Connecticut laws also include collection restrictions with 
greater breadth.  The holder of a court judgment arising out of services pro-
                                                                                                                           
75 (2004); Jack E. Karns, Justifying the Nonprofit Hospital Tax Exemption in a Competitive Market En-
vironment, 13 WIDENER L.J. 383 (2004).  See generally M. Gregg Bloche, Health Policy Below the Wa-
terline:  Medical Care and the Charitable Exemption, 80 MINN. L. REV. 299 (1995); John D. Colombo, 
The Role of Access in Charitable Tax Exemption, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 343 (2004); Jill R. Horwitz, Why 
We Need the Independent Sector:  The Behavior, Law, and Ethics of Not-For-Profit Hospitals, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 1345, 1349 (2003); Alice A. Noble et al., Charitable Hospital Accountability:  A Review 
and Analysis of Legal and Policy Initiatives, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 116 (1998).   
31  See Bilimoria, supra note 29, at 135 (reporting more than fifty attempted class action lawsuits 
filed against more than 370 hospitals); CaseConnect, http://www.nfplitigation.com/FCWSite/Features/ 
Extranets/NotForProfit/FCXRedirectNotForProfit.aspx (click on “Continue” button; then follow “Fact-
sheet” hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 6, 2005) (providing lawsuit documents).  But see Federal Judge 
Dismisses Suit Claiming Hospital System Charged More to Uninsured, FOOD & DRUG L. WEEK., Feb. 
25, 2005, at 74 (reporting on denial of class action status and dismissal of suit). 
32  See, e.g., Williams v. Yale New Haven Hosp., Inc., No. CV030479268, 2004 WL 2663971 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2004) (contesting charge arising from debt collection proceedings against 
property in which defendant no longer had interest due to divorce); Gibson v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 
No. CV980414230S, 2003 WL 22079573 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2003); Hospital Going to Trial, 
MOD. HEALTHCARE, Jan. 17, 2005, at 4 (reporting on suit filed by Legal Assistance Foundation of Met-
ropolitan Chicago against Resurrection Medical Center as one of the first of two lawsuits not to be dis-
missed).  
33  See Act of July 9, 2003, Pub. Act No. 03-266, 2003 Conn. Acts 266 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19A-509b, 649, 673 (West 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 37-3b, -3c; 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-192a, -352b, -356a, -356d (West 2003)).  
34  See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19A-673(a)(4).  
35  See id. § 19A-673b(a) (West Supp. 2005).  
36  See id. § 19A-673(b) (West 2003).  
37  See id. § 19A-673(c).  
38  See id. § 19A-509b(d).  A hospital bed fund refers to gifts of money, stock, other financial in-
struments, or other property made to establish a fund to provide medical care to patients at a hospital.  
Id. 19A-509b(a)(1).  
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vided at a hospital may not levy on or execute against a patient’s property 
until the patient also has defaulted on a court-ordered payment plan.39  
Courts may not impose judgment interest that exceeds five percent in this 
context.40  A debtor has a higher homestead exemption in the event of a 
judgment arising out of hospital services than in the event of judgments 
arising out of any other circumstance.41 
Connecticut is not alone.  Legislatures in states across the country, in-
cluding California,42 Florida,43 Illinois,44 New York,45 and Mississippi46 have 
proposed various measures to restrict hospitals’ current financial practices, 
particularly with respect to the uninsured.47  
Perhaps to prevent new restrictions and requirements from being en-
acted, hospitals furiously studied and vowed to change their billing and col-
lection practices.48  State hospital associations worked quickly to develop 
new guidelines and to rush them into print.49  Hospitals promised to refrain 
 
39  See id. § 52-356a(a).  
40  See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 37-3a(b) (West 2003). 
41  See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-352b(t) (West 2003) (providing for a $125,000 exemption 
rather than a $75,000 exemption).  For other state exemptions that operate differently in the event of 
medical debts or medical problems, see sources cited infra note 183. 
42  See Assemb. B. 1401, 2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003); Assemb. B. 232, 2003-04 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 2003); S.B. 24 2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003); Assemb. B. 774, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 2005). 
43  See S.B. 1988, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2004); H.B. 425, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2004); 
H.B. 715, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2004).  
44  See S.B. 2579, 93rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2004).  See generally Bilimoria, supra note 
29, at 137.  
45  See A.O. 2521, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005). 
46  See S.B. 2506, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2005). 
47  See Laura B. Benko, Veto Power:  Bill Mandating Discounts for Uninsured Gets Spiked, MOD. 
HEALTHCARE, Sept. 27, 2004, at 14 (explaining veto of California bill).  See generally Andrew 
McKinley, Hospital Billing Practices and the Uninsured:  An Emerging Legislative Response, 
HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Nov. 2004, at 14 (reviewing status of legislation). 
48  See PATIENT FRIENDLY BILLING PROJECT, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N, HOSPITALS SHARE 
INSIGHTS TO IMPROVE FINANCIAL POLICIES FOR UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED PATIENTS (2005), 
available at http://www.patientfriendlybilling.org/2005report/2005_pfb_report.pdf; ANDREA B. STAITI, 
ROBERT E. HURLEY, & PETER J. CUNNINGHAM, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, 
BALANCING MARGIN AND MISSION:  HOSPITALS ALTER BILLING AND COLLECTION PRACTICES FOR 
UNINSURED PATIENTS (2005), available at http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/788/788.pdf; Richard 
L. Clarke, Charging and  Collection Concerns, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Aug. 2003, at 136; cf. Patrick 
Reilly, An Ounce of Prevention, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Feb. 2, 2004, at 6 (describing damage control 
measures taken by the American Hospital Association to “soften the public relations blow expected from 
[congressional] hearings on hospital billing practices” including sending a letter to Health and Human 
Services’s Tommy Thompson “urging Medicare to relax federal regulations that the association says 
force hospitals to bill full charges to the poor”).   
49  See, e.g., CAL. HOSP. ASS’N, CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL BILLING AND COLLECTION PRACTICES:  
VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR ASSISTING LOW-INCOME UNINSURED PATIENTS (2004); 
HEALTHCARE ASS’N OF N.Y., FINANCIAL AID/CHARITY CARE POLICY AT NEW YORK’S NOT-FOR-
PROFIT HOSPITALS:  GUIDELINES FROM THE HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK STATE (2004); 
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voluntarily from otherwise legal activities under certain circumstances.50  
Some hospitals released liens they had placed on patients’ property.51  At 
least one hospital attempted to “settle” a lawsuit that had not even been 
filed; under the agreement, it would have paid millions of dollars to patients 
and promised to limit its future debt collection.52  In the frenzy to be respon-
sive, some hospitals may have agreed to do things they cannot control or 
apply consistently, such as promising not to authorize a collection effort 
that would result in a bankruptcy.53 
There may be many reasons why the issue has been framed in terms of 
hospital misbehavior.  In some circumstances, not-for-profit hospitals may 
not have been fulfilling their charitable obligations, and their aggressive 
business-like behavior conflicted with the public’s innate sense of how 
charitable institutions should conduct themselves.54  Health care and union 
advocates directly accused the hospitals of wrongdoing.55  Lawmakers 
                                                                                                                           
ILL. HOSP. ASS’N & METRO. CHI. HEALTHCARE COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON CHARITY 
CARE AND COLLECTION PRACTICES FOR THE UNINSURED (2003).   
50  See, e.g., Hearing on Hospital Billing and Collections, supra note 28, at 89 (written statement of 
Kevin E. Lofton, Catholic Health Initiatives) (instructing debt collectors not to seek liens that would re-
quire sale or foreclosure of residence); id. at 102 (written statement of Herbert Pardes, New York Pres-
byterian Hospital) (stating that collectors should not seek foreclosure on residence or pursue income 
executions on patient’s spouse); PATIENT FRIENDLY BILLING PROJECT, supra note 48, at 15; see also Liz 
Kowalczyk, Hospital Softens Collection Tactics:  State Agency Tells Baystate Some Policies Inappro-
priate, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 27, 2005, at C1 (reporting on hospital’s decision not to sue patients or place 
liens on homes except for largest unpaid bills). 
51  See, e.g., JOHN KASPRAK, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, CONN. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 
HOSPITAL DEBT COLLECTION LAW (2004), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2004/rpt/2004-R-
0103.htm (reporting that Yale-New Haven Hospital announced that it released ninety-five percent of its 
2500 liens on area homes).  It is possible that this is at least in part an admission that some of these pa-
tients should not have been liable for their bills in the first place because they were eligible for charity 
care or free bed funds.  
52  See Tanya Albert, Mississippi Hospital Agrees to Lower Charges for Uninsured Patients, AM. 
MED. NEWS, Aug. 23, 2004, at 5; Ceci Connoly, Tax-Exempt Hospitals’ Practices Challenged:  46 Law-
suits Allege that Uninsured Pay the Most, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2005, at A1 (explaining why settlement 
did not get finalized); Michele Molnar, Discount Dilemma:  Collecting from the Uninsured, 
COLLECTIONS & CREDIT RISK, Oct. 2004, at 30. 
53  See, e.g., Hearing on Hospital Billing and Collections, supra note 28, at 83 (written statement of 
Anthony R. Tersigni, Ascension Health). 
54  See generally Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity:  A Historical Analysis of America’s 
Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437 (2005) (exploring competing pressures on nonprofit 
institutions).  
55  See, e.g., CONN. CTR. FOR A NEW ECON., UNCHARITABLE CARE:  YALE-NEW HAVEN HOSPITAL’S 
CHARITY CARE AND COLLECTIONS PRACTICES (2003), available at http://www.seiu.org/docUploads/ 
Discriminatory_Pricing__yale_uncharitable_care.pdf; MED. BILLING TASK FORCE, CHAMPAIGN 
COUNTY HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS, MEDICAL DEBT REPORT:  HOW MEDICAL DEBT AFFECTS 
CHAMPAIGN COUNTY CONSUMERS:  A COMMUNITY REPORT ON MEDICAL DEBT-RELATED 
BANKRUPTCIES AND SMALL CLAIMS LAWSUITS (2002), available at http://www.prairienet.org/cchcc/ 
Medical_Debt/med-dp2.htm.  Some speculate that the unions took this position as leverage in a unioni-
zation fight.  See, e.g., Washburn, supra note 23 (citing alderman saying union “is trying to muddy up 
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wanted to avoid intractable debates over the structural problems, such as 
covering the uninsured.56  Changes in hospital pricing and practices could 
facilitate wider use of high deductible insurance plans in accordance with 
the goals of some patient advocates.57  Recent attention on corporate re-
sponsibility and accountability may have increased the propensity to target 
hospital management as wrongdoers.58 
We believe that media portrayal of the issues also played a role.59  In 
helping to shape public perceptions of problems,60 the news media inevita-
bly help frame the range of solutions considered.61  This possibility has led 
to research on the media’s effect on the public’s perceptions of the field of 
medicine, declining respect for health care professionals,62 and health care 
provider misdoings or failings.63  For example, researchers have found that 
                                                                                                                           
the nuns in order to unionize their workers”); Union Puts Heat on Hospital Group, CHI. TRIB., June 15, 
2004, at C3. 
56  See Hearing on Hospital Billing and Collections, supra note 28, at 4 (statement of Rep. Green-
wood, Member, House Comm. on Energy & Commerce). 
57  See, e.g., Rhonda L. Rundle, Activist for Uninsured Needles Hospitals—And Draws Blood, WALL 
ST. J., June 10, 2003, at A1; Hospital Victims Project, http://www.hospitalvictims.com (last visited Dec. 
6, 2005) (endorsing tax free health insurance certificate proposal for families to buy low cost insurance); 
Press Release, Florida Hospital Ass’n, FHA Calls on K.B. Forbes to Cease Irresponsible Attack Ads and 
to Fully Disclose His Funding Sources and Insurance Ties (Mar. 8, 2004), available at 
http://news.banctec.com/clari/article.php?id=3&group=clari.biz.industry.insurance.releases. 
58  See generally Thomas L. Greaney & Kathleen L. Boozang, Mission, Margin, and Trust in the 
Non-Profit Health Enterprise, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2005).  
59  See, e.g., W. Lance Bennett, Cracking the News Code:  Some Rules that Journalists Live by, in 
DO THE MEDIA GOVERN?:  POLITICIANS, VOTERS, AND REPORTERS IN AMERICA 103 (Shanto Iyengar & 
Richard Reeves eds., 1997); Joel Best, “Road Warriors” on “Hair Trigger Highways”:  Cultural Re-
sources and the Media’s Construction of the 1987 Freeway Shootings Problem, 61 SOC. INQUIRY 327, 
334–35 (1991); Neal R. Feigenson, Accidents as Melodrama, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 741, 742 (1999); 
Elayne Rapping, Television, Melodrama, and the Rise of the Victims’ Rights Movement, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 665, 688–89 (1999).  See generally RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP:  THE 
VANISHING LINE BETWEEN LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE 155–61 (2000). 
60  A significant thread of social science literature considers how the media shape or “frame” our 
conception of reality.  See MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF NEWS 35 (2003) (defining framing 
as “principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, 
what happens, and what matters”).   
61  See generally Melissa B. Jacoby, Negotiating Bankruptcy Legislation Through the News Media, 
41 HOUS. L. REV. 1091, 1107–15 (2004) (literature review). 
62  See, e.g., Nazia Y. Ali et al., Bad Press for Doctors:  21 Year Survey of Three National Newspa-
pers, 323 BRIT. MED. J. 782 (2001); Deborah Lupton & Jane McLean, Representing Doctors:  Dis-
courses and Images in the Australian Press, 46 SOC. SCI. MED. 947 (1998).  
63  See, e.g., Hannah Bradby et al., ‘Sexy Docs’ and ‘Busty Blondes’:  Press Coverage of Profes-
sional Misconduct Cases Brought Before the General Medical Council, 17 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 
458, 470 (1995); Michael Calnan & Simon Williams, Images of Scientific Medicine, 14 SOC. HEALTH & 
ILLNESS 233 (1992); Jonathan Gabe et al., Mediating Illness:  Newspaper Coverage of Tranquilliser 
Dependence, 13 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 332, 344–45 (1991); Deborah Lupton, Doctors in the News 
Media:  Lay and Medical Audiences’ Responses, 34 J. SOC. 35 (1998); Huw Talfryn et al., Public Trust 
and Accountability for Clinical Performance:  Lessons from the National Press Reportage of the Bristol 
Hearing, 5 J. EVALUATION CLINICAL PRAC. 335, 338 (1999) (finding hostile and emotive treatment of 
individual doctors and of the profession generally). 
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media coverage affects the likelihood and the nature of the government’s 
response to allegations of problems with medications.64  They also have ex-
plored how the media play a role in people’s estimation of their risk of dis-
ease or their understanding of scientific findings.65  These studies suggest 
the media have the power to frame, and might prefer to frame, the current 
debates in terms of hospital misbehavior—which would resonate with the 
public through its use of common and salient themes—rather than in terms 
of structural limitations.  
In summary, a public problem characterized as hospital misbehavior 
has emerged.  Whatever the reasons for such framing, the data we explore 
below suggest that the hospital misbehavior model is the wrong vehicle to 
prevent serious medical-related financial distress.   
III. BEYOND HOSPITAL MISBEHAVIOR:  AN EMPIRICAL INQUIRY 
Several empirical projects cast doubt on the hospital misbehavior 
model by revealing the breadth of medical-related financial distress.  We 
cite these sources throughout Part III, but in the text that follows, we focus 
principally on analyzing data collected from individuals who have filed for 
bankruptcy.   
The federal bankruptcy system permits the collection of information on 
families in financial trouble.  Under penalty of perjury, bankruptcy filers 
must file with federal courts substantial information about their financial 
circumstances.66  They also must submit to an examination by a trustee and 
creditors.67  Because the bankruptcy process is public, researchers can con-
tact filers and ask them to complete questionnaires and follow-up inter-
views that substantially enrich the information in the courts’ files.  The 
opportunities to gather more data, combined with the extensive information 
already in the court records, make the bankruptcy system a particularly 
fruitful area for studying the origins of financial pressure—medical-related 
and otherwise—on households.68   
 
64  See Jonathan Gabe & Michael Bury, Halcion Nights:  A Sociological Account of a Medical Con-
troversy, 30 SOC. 447, 459 (1996). 
65  See, e.g., Deena Blanchard et al., Read All About It:  The Over-Representation of Breast Cancer 
in Popular Magazines, 35 PREVENTIVE MED. 343, 346–47 (2002) (finding a greater than 600% increase 
in number of breast cancer articles per year over a ten-year period compared with an increase of less 
than 50% for cardiovascular disease articles); Juanne N. Clarke, Breast Cancer in Mass Circulating 
Magazines in the U.S.A. and Canada, 1974–1995, 28 WOMEN & HEALTH 113, 114 (1999). 
66  Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Official Bankruptcy Form #1, Voluntary Petition, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/bankform/b1-page2.pdf (including signature and declaration under penalty of 
perjury that information provided in petition is true and correct); Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Offi-
cial Bankruptcy Form #6, Declaration Concerning Debtor’s Schedules, available at  
http://www.uscourts.gov/bkforms/official/b6-decl.pdf.   
67  See 11 U.S.C. § 341 (2000) (requiring meeting with trustee and creditors).  
68  For literature reviews, see Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa A. Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking 
the Debates over Health Care Financing:  Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
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Bankruptcy filers as a group are not chronically disadvantaged, as dis-
tinguished from some of the individuals who were highlighted in the me-
dia’s hospital misbehavior discussions and who come readily to mind in 
conversations about the uninsured or people struggling to pay medical 
bills.69  The incomes of bankruptcy filers during the year before filing are 
low,70 but their more enduring criteria—education, occupation, and home-
ownership—place many of them in the middle class.71  This characterization 
arguably makes the full set of data collected through the federal bankruptcy 
system even more relevant to testing the hospital misbehavior model be-
cause it makes clear that the scope of people at risk of medical-related fi-
nancial failure is much broader than a hospital’s charity care policy could 
address.72 
Commenced in 2001, Phase III of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project 
studies individuals who filed for bankruptcy in judicial districts in Califor-
nia, Texas, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee.73  The project has several 
                                                                                                                           
375, 378–82 (2001) [hereinafter Jacoby, Sullivan & Warren, Rethinking the Debates], and an updated 
supplement, Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient:  In Search of Non-Debt-Based Alternatives, 69 
BROOK. L. REV. 453, 454–61 (2004). 
69  See generally Hearing on Hospital Billing and Collections, supra note 28.  
70  In the year prior to filing for bankruptcy, the median income of medical bankruptcy filers was 
$24,500, see David U. Himmelstein et al., Market Watch:  Illness and Injury as Contributors to Bank-
ruptcy, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 2, 2005, at W5-63 exhibit 1, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/ 
hlthaff.w5.63/DC1, which was less than half of the national median family income in 2000 ($51,751), 
see CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES:  
2000, at 2 tbl.A (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p60-213.pdf, and almost 
200% of the Federal Poverty Rate for a family of three that year ($13,470), see JOSEPH DALAKER, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES:  2000, at 5 (2001), available at http://www.census. 
gov/prod/2001pubs/p60-214.pdf.  
71  See Elizabeth Warren, The Economics of Race:  When Making It to the Middle Is Not Enough, 61 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1777, 1782 (2004); Elizabeth Warren, Financial Collapse and Class Status:  Who 
Goes Bankrupt?, 41 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115 (2003) (reviewing socioeconomic status of 2001 bank-
ruptcy sample).  Overall, over ninety percent of the medical bankruptcy filers could be characterized as 
middle class on the criteria of college education, homeownership, or occupational prestige scores.  The 
lists of codes for occupational prestige were developed by the National Organization for Research at the 
University of Chicago (“NORC”).  See generally Robert W. Hodge, Paul M. Siegel & Peter H. Rossi, 
Occupational Prestige in the United States, 1925–63, 70 AM. J. SOC. 286 (1964); NORC, Summary of 
the Occupational Prestige Studies, http://cloud9.norc.uchicago.edu/faqs/prestige.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 
2005).   
72  For example, Kane and Wubbenhorst have found that even if all not-for-profit hospitals provided 
“care equal to the value of their tax exemptions,” this would produce less than $100 in new care per un-
insured person per year.  See Nancy M. Kane & William H. Wubbenhorst, Alternative Funding Policies 
for the Uninsured:  Exploring the Value of Hospital Tax Exemption, 78 MILBANK Q. 185, 208 (2000).   
73  Phases I and II of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project (“CBP”) were studies of individuals and 
families who filed for bankruptcy in 1981 and 1991 for which Professors Teresa Sullivan, Jay West-
brook, and Elizabeth Warren were the principal researchers.  In 1999, Sullivan and Warren were joined 
by Melissa Jacoby to undertake a supplemental study of personal bankruptcy filers in eight judicial dis-
tricts.  What we now refer to as Phase III of the CBP is the study of individuals and families who filed 
for bankruptcy in 2001.  Phase III relied on a diverse group of professors from research universities 
around the country to design and implement the study.  In February 2001, the CBP started assembling a 
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components that together present an in-depth picture of medical problems 
and financial difficulty.74  The filers represented in the project are a random 
sample of debtors who filled out written questionnaires prior to attending a 
meeting with the bankruptcy trustee and creditors.75  The core sample is 
comprised of 1250 bankruptcy cases.  A supplemental homeowner sample 
also was collected, bringing the total number of cases to 1771.  
A subset of the filers participated in in-depth, follow-up telephone in-
terviews, in which they discussed housing, self-employment, and medical 
problems and also offered detailed narrative accounts of their paths to the 
bankruptcy court.76  Almost half (48%) of the debtors in the core sample 
completed a telephone questionnaire.77  As part of the telephone survey, 
those debtors who specifically identified medical problems as a significant 
component of their financial distress responded to detailed inquiries regard-
ing the circumstances that led to their bankruptcy filings.78  In these surveys, 
respondents discussed issues such as diagnoses, time of illness or injury on-
set, source of health insurance coverage, responsibility for and amount of 
insurance premiums, employment status at illness onset, income sources 
during illness and reasons for loss of income during illness, types of medi-
cal debt, medical care utilization, and use of savings or credit products to 
make ends meet.79   
We had access to a third source of information about the debtors—
court records80—but we did not rely on this source for quantifying medical 
bills.  In early studies, researchers examined claims filed with the court to 
estimate the impact of medical bills on bankruptcy filings.81  By 2001, how-
                                                                                                                           
core random sample of 1250 debtors from five federal judicial districts in each of the states mentioned in 
the text.  In each district, we first randomly selected Chapter 7 and 13 filers in the same proportion as the 
numbers of filers in that district.  The CBP also created a supplemental sample of 521 homeowners from 
California, Illinois, and Pennsylvania, producing a sample of 1771 cases.  All of the debtors are indi-
viduals, including individuals filing jointly.  For a more detailed description of the selection of the dis-
tricts and the sample, see ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP:  
WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 181–88 (2003); Robert M. Lawless & 
Elizabeth Warren, The Myth of the Disappearing Business Bankruptcy, 93 CAL. L. REV. 743 (2005).  
74  See generally Himmelstein et al., supra note 70, at W5-63 (describing in detail medical-related 
aspects of the 2001 study). 
75  See Elizabeth Warren, Bankrupt Children, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1003, 1028–32 (2002) (reprinting 
questionnaire).  The questionnaire was distributed at the meeting of creditors that takes place early in a 
bankruptcy case.  See 11 U.S.C. § 341 (2000) (providing for meeting).  
76  See WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 73, at 181-88.     
77  In addition, debtors in the extended homeowner sample also completed telephone questionnaires 
for a total of 840 completed telephone surveys.   
78  See Himmelstein et al., supra note 70, at W5-65. 
79  See Consumer Bankruptcy Project Telephone Survey Coding Grid (on file with Northwestern 
University Law Review).   
80  WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 73, at 186. 
81  See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS WE 
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS:  BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 168 (1989) (using 1981 
data).  
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ever, people had changed substantially how they pay medical bills.  Phar-
macies, physicians, medical supply stores, physical therapists, home health 
care services, and a host of other health care providers routinely accept 
credit cards, which means that medical bills can take the form of general 
credit card debts and not medical debts in the court records.  Even large and 
extraordinary outstanding debts, such as hospital bills or surgeon’s fees, 
may not be identifiable.  As we note later, some large medical obligations 
have been financed through second mortgages or home equity lines of 
credit.  In other cases, the health care providers steered the debtors to a fi-
nance company to manage the credit end of the transaction.  Because of 
these types of changes, we concluded that using court records to evaluate 
the impact of direct medical costs would result in a significant undercount.   
In the section that follows, we explore data from the written question-
naires and from the telephone surveys, using what the debtors themselves 
told us about the medical and financial conditions that led to their bankrupt-
cies.  We then turn to data on specific types of medical-related financial dis-
tress that expose the severe limitations of the hospital misbehavior model.  
A. Filing for Bankruptcy in the Aftermath of Medical Problems 
Our research method relies heavily on self-reporting by debtors, and it 
is possible that debtors perceive the role of medical problems differently 
from an omniscient observer.  Some might overstate the role of ill health 
because it seems to be a more acceptable explanation than, for example, 
overspending.82  Overstating is more difficult in the context of highly de-
tailed questions over a period of time, as in the telephone surveys, but none-
theless is possible.83  The role of medical problems may be understated as 
well.  Some filers did not finish the written questionnaire and thus did not 
respond to the last question that asked them to indicate reasons for their 
bankruptcy filings; on the basis of the nonresponse, we count them as not 
having a medical reason for filing, which may or may not be correct.84  In 
addition, some filers did not characterize their problems as medical-related 
even when health difficulties triggered their financial problems.  For exam-
ple, some said they filed for bankruptcy to save their homes from foreclo-
sure; only later, in detailed questioning, would it emerge that the now-
defaulted mortgage had been taken out to pay big medical bills.  Others at-
tributed financial downfall to large credit card debts or time off from work, 
obscuring what others might have considered medical reasons.  In addition, 
debtors who participated in the telephone survey had a disincentive to re-
 
82  See Jacoby, Sullivan & Warren, Rethinking the Debates, supra note 68, at 384–85 (explaining 
over-attribution possibility). 
83  See Himmelstein et al., supra note 70, at W5-71. 
84  Of the 1250 in the core sample, 28 did not answer this last question, question twelve.  Of the total 
sample of 1771 bankruptcy filings (core plus supplemental homeowner), 44 did not answer question 
twelve.   
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port medical-related financial problems.  Respondents who said that medi-
cal problems did not play a role in their bankruptcies avoided another half 
an hour’s worth of probing and sometimes embarrassing questions.85     
For these and other reasons, it is challenging to determine which debt-
ors can be said to have “medical bankruptcies.”86  We recognize that re-
searchers might make different judgment calls about which debtors should 
be included and which should not in this category.  To make the data as 
useful as possible, we offer a breakdown of the approaches in Figure 1 and 
the subsequent figures.   
In the written survey, about 27% of the debtors from the core sample 
indicated illness or injury as a reason for filing bankruptcy, 7% identified 
the birth of a child as a reason for filing bankruptcy, and another 7% ex-
plained that a death in the family—which studies in the past have inter-
preted to have a medical component87—precipitated their filings.88  Among 
those from the core sample who took the telephone survey, about 35% of 
the debtors indicated illness or injury of self or family member, addition of 
a family member, or death of a family member as a reason for their bank-
ruptcy filings.89  When we combine responses from the written question-
naires and the telephone surveys, about 46% self-identified a medical 
reason (birth, death, illness, or injury) among their reasons for filing bank-
ruptcy.90 
 
85  Debtors were paid the same amount for their participation in the telephone survey ($50) regard-
less of how many portions they completed.  Some may have refused to respond to the medical portion to 
end the interview more quickly, whether or not their financial difficulties had a medical component.  At 
the margins, this might have produced under-representation in the telephone surveys. 
86  See supra Part III.E and Figures 1–3.  
87  See Jacoby, Sullivan & Warren, Rethinking the Debates, supra note 68, at 390. 
88  N = 1250. 
89  N = 602 (debtors with both telephone survey and written questionnaire). 
90  N = 602.  Note that the N drops from the questionnaire data alone (1250 for the core sample) be-
cause the response rate on the follow-up telephone surveys was about half of all the core sample families 
that completed questionnaires.  This means that any data that combine the paper questionnaires and tele-
phone surveys can use only the smaller N from the telephone surveys.  Because the “reasons” informa-
tion is drawn from two sources instead of one, it is both different and more complete than the data 
reported in Himmelstein et al., supra note 70. 
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Source:  2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project (*Written Questionnaire, N = 1250;  
**Phone Survey, N = 602; ***Phone/Written Combined, N = 602) 
 
Our study collected other indications of medical-related financial dis-
tress whether or not the debtor self-identified medical reasons for filing.  In 
the written questionnaire, about one in five debtors (21%) from the core 
sample indicated that they had lost at least two weeks’ income because of a 
medical problem.91  In some situations, the primary wage earner was ill, and 
in others, the wage earner had to care for a child, spouse, or elderly relative.  
Either way, we surmised that the loss of at least two weeks’ income consti-
tuted a hard financial blow for families of modest means.   
Some filers had mortgaged their homes in order to pay off medical 
debts.  The numbers were modest—2% of the total sample, about 4% of the 
homeowners surveyed—but the impact on the family finances could be 
quite serious.92  Many but not all of those who mortgaged their homes or 
lost time from work had self-identified as filing for bankruptcy at least in 
part because of medical problems.  Combining the data from self-
 
91  N = 1250. 
92  N = 1250. 












Medical Reason* Birth* Death* Medical Reason** Total***
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identifiers, as depicted in Figure 1, with these other filers increases the total 
percentage of medical-related filers to 56%.   
Source:  2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project  
(*Written Questionnaire, N = 1250; ***Phone/Written Combined, N = 602) 
 
Other responses from filers also produce inferences of medical-related 
financial problems.  For example, some researchers may want to include the 
2% of the sample that identified alcohol and drug problems as a reason for 
filing.93  For parents who explained that they had bankrupted themselves 
putting their teenaged children through substance abuse rehabilitation pro-
grams, this would seem to be an appropriate inclusion.  Similarly, other re-
searchers would want to include the 1% of the sample who identified a 
family member’s gambling problem as a reason for filing, recognizing that 
some families get left behind financially when a spouse or parent goes on a 
gambling binge, loses the house, and leaves everyone deep in debt.94  In ad-
 
93  N = 1250. 
94  Gambling is classified as a psychiatric disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Men-
tal Disorders.  See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (4th ed. text rev. 2000). 





















100:535  (2006) Beyond Hospital Misbehavior 
 551 
dition, about a quarter (26%) of the debtors in the core sample reported hav-
ing medical bills in excess of $1000 that were not covered by insurance in 
the two years before filing.95   
Not all researchers would agree that each of these three indicators, 
standing alone, should be characterized as a medical-related filing.  To 
make the data as accessible as possible, we present our report both ways in 
Figure 3.  If we exclude these three measures, the proportion of families fil-
ing for bankruptcy in the aftermath of a medical problem is 56%; if they are 
included, the number climbs to 63%. 
By any analysis, this study finds a substantial number of families filing 
for bankruptcy in part to deal with the fallout from medical problems.  If the 
proportions we observe in the 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project are rep-
resentative of bankruptcy filers nationwide, this would mean that an esti-
mated 668,000 to 915,000 families filed for bankruptcy in a single year, 
2001, at least in part due to medical-related financial distress.96  These num-
bers likely still pale in comparison with the number of debtors who avoid 
bankruptcy despite similar problems.97  Yet, the experiences of bankruptcy 
filers are nonetheless relevant to evaluating the hospital misbehavior model.  
 
95  N = 1250.  The incomes for these households in the year before filing were quite modest.  The 
median income was about $25,000, and even at the 80th percentile, income was only slightly above 
$40,000.  Even an unpaid medical debt of $1000 would likely cause a strain for many of these house-
holds.  Of course, $1000 is only the threshold number.  The telephone surveys completed by a subset of 
the sample revealed medical debts at much higher amounts.  See Himmelstein et al., supra note 70, at 
W5-70 (reporting mean out-of-pocket expenses of $11,854) (N = 331).  
96  To estimate the number of families that will be affected, we use the data on bankruptcies from the 
Administrative Office of the United States (“AO”) courts.  We follow the AO classification of cases into 
“business” and “non-business,” using the “non-business” classification as a proxy for the number of 
households filing for bankruptcy.  In other work, the AO methods for distinguishing between business 
and non-business cases have been criticized because the count of “non-business bankruptcies” includes 
approximately 300,000 self-employed debtors, many of whom had small businesses that failed.  See 
Lawless & Warren, supra note 73.  In addition, the way in which the AO data are reported has changed 
over time, and this makes it difficult to evaluate trends in business and non-business filing rates from the 
mid-1980s.  For the purposes of this work, however, the difficulties in distinguishing non-business filers 
from self-employed filers is less important.  Whether they are wage earners or entrepreneurs, the non-
business bankruptcies represent a household in financial trouble, and this is the appropriate unit of 
analysis here.  
97  See, e.g., USA TODAY, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HARVARD SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, HEALTH 
CARE COST SURVEY:  SUMMARY AND CHARTPACK 11 chart 3 (2005), available at http://www.kff.org/ 
newsmedia/upload/7371.pdf [hereinafter HEALTH CARE COST SURVEY] (reporting that only a small per-
centage of sample who indicated medical-related financial distress filed bankruptcy); Michelle J. White, 
Personal Bankruptcy Filing Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code:  An Economic Analysis, 63 IND. L.J. 1, 
50 (1987) (finding more households would benefit from bankruptcy than actually file); Press Release, 
Cambridge Consumer Credit Index, 83% of Americans with Medical Debts Say Those Debts Are 
Enough of a Burden to Prevent Them from Making Other Major Purchases (Feb. 7, 2004), available at 
http://www.cambridgeconsumerindex.com/index.asp?content=press_release (reporting that based on 
poll of over 800 adults, “83% of Americans say that debts they have incurred because of medical or den-
tal procedures are burdensome enough to prevent them from buying large ticket items”); Amanda E. 
Dawsey & Lawrence M. Ausubel, Informal Bankruptcy (Apr. 12, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.ausubel.com/creditcard-papers/informal-bankruptcy.pdf. 
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As we explore below, the hospital misbehavior model does not capture the 
circumstances of these filers.   
Source:  2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project  
(*Written Questionnaire, N = 1250; ***Phone/Written Combined, N = 602) 
 
B. Health Insurance and Medical-Related Indebtedness 
Legislative, litigation, and voluntary hospital responses have targeted 
hospitals’ financial treatment of the low-income chronically uninsured, an 
approach that is consistent with the hospital misbehavior model.98  Our 
study of bankruptcy filers, however, reveals that it is common for people 
with health insurance to develop medical-related financial problems.   
 
98  See, e.g., Hearing on Hospital Billing and Collections, supra note 28, at 283 (making clear that 
Ascension Health’s charity care policy is inapplicable to co-payments and deductibles of insured pay-
ments and providers of medical savings accounts). 
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Medical and nonmedical bankruptcy filers in the written questionnaire 
sample had similar health insurance rates at the time of the filing.99  Almost 
seven out of ten (67.4%) medical filers said all family members had insur-
ance at the time of the filing.100  Among the telephone survey medical sam-
ple, more than three-quarters reported that the ill or injured person(s) had 
insurance at illness onset.101  More than eight out of ten (82.7%) of the ill or 
injured person(s) in the telephone survey medical sample were insured at 
the time of the telephone interview.102  Yet, medical debt caused financial 
difficulty for the insured.  Indeed, those with private insurance at illness on-
set reported higher out-of-pocket costs on average ($13,460) than those 
uninsured at illness onset ($10,893).103   
These data are consistent with several other empirical studies of bank-
ruptcy filers and of the general population.  A study of individuals who 
filed for bankruptcy in 1999 reported a high rate of insurance coverage 
among bankruptcy filers who indicated that a medical problem contributed 
to their financial troubles.104  Outside of the bankruptcy context, nationwide 
and local studies by groups such as the Commonwealth Fund, the Center for 
Studying Health System Change, the Kaiser Family Foundation, and the 
Access Project have observed significant financial vulnerability and medi-
 
99  See Himmelstein et al., supra note 70, at W5-66 to -67 (measuring medical-related bankruptcy 
two ways and finding no statistically significant difference when comparing to debtors citing no medical 
cause). 
100  N = 1771 (core plus homeowner written questionnaire sample, weighted).  Id.  The figure for 
nonmedical filers was 65.5%, but the difference was not statistically significant. 
101  See id. at W5-69. 
102  N = 391 (core plus homeowner telephone survey sample, unweighted, measured by people in-
stead of cases).  Valid N = 329.  The percentage calculated by cases rather than people results in a simi-
lar figure—82.83%.  N = 331.  Valid N = 297.  Id.    
103  N = 331.  See id. at W5-70 exhibit 5.  These figures include those with no out-of-pocket costs.  
Possible explanations for lower costs for the uninsured include less health-seeking behavior and that 
some insured later lost coverage.  Compare Wenke Hwang et al., Out-of-Pocket Medical Spending for 
Care of Chronic Conditions, 20 HEALTH AFF. 267, 272 (2001) (finding in a study of 1996 data that the 
mean out-of-pocket spending was higher for the uninsured than for the insured, although the uninsured 
were less likely to see a provider).  These figures are significant when compared to the income levels of 
the written questionnaire sample.  Himmelstein et al., supra note 70, at W5-66 exhibit 1 (median income 
$24,500).  It is also possible that these data reveal little about how much debt the insured and uninsured 
actually incur for medical treatment and simply identify the average point at which various people give 
up and file for bankruptcy.  See generally The Increase in Personal Bankruptcy and the Crisis in Con-
sumer Credit:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 21 (1997) (prepared statement by Ian Domowitz, Professor, Northwestern 
University) (identifying unsecured medical debt as the single largest determinant of personal bankruptcy 
at the margin, explaining that medical debt in excess of two percent of income “results in a propensity to 
file which is 28 times that of the average household,” and noting that two percent of the general popula-
tion had this much medical debt at the time of his study). 
104  See Jacoby, Sullivan & Warren, Rethinking the Debates, supra note 68, at 399–404 (finding 
about 80% of petitioners insured at time of filing, including about 80% of medical-related filers). 
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cal indebtedness even among the insured.105  These findings come as no 
surprise to hospital executives and other commentators who observe that 
co-pays and deductibles among insured patients can be a significant part of 
a hospital’s bad debt.106    
In addition to indicating medical-related indebtedness even for insured 
patients, the findings from the 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project also re-
mind us that “insured” and “uninsured” are not stable categories.  Among 
the telephone survey medical sample of bankruptcy filers, one-third of those 
with private coverage at illness onset reported that they lost coverage at 
some point during the course of their illness.107  Assuming that our sample is 
 
105  See, e.g., SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., THE AFFORDABILITY CRISIS IN U.S. HEALTH CARE:  
FINDINGS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH FUND BIENNIAL HEALTH INSURANCE SURVEY xii, 17 (2004), 
available at http://www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/collins_biennial2003_723.pdf (noting that two out of five 
adults had medical bill problems or accrued medical debt even though sixty-two percent had insurance); 
HEALTH CARE COST SURVEY, supra note 97, at 9 chart 1 (reporting that 61% of those having trouble 
paying medical bills were insured); JESSICA H. MAY & PETER J. CUNNINGHAM, CTR. FOR STUDYING 
HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, TOUGH TRADE-OFFS:  MEDICAL BILLS, FAMILY FINANCES, AND ACCESS TO 
CARE 1 (2004), available at http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/689/689.pdf (finding about 43 million 
people have medical debt problems even though about two-thirds have insurance); NAT’L PUB. RADIO, 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HARVARD UNIV. KENNEDY SCH. OF GOV’T, SURVEY ON HEALTH CARE 
(2002), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/20020605a-index.cfm (stating that over one fifth of 
families reported medical debt problems, including 15% of those with insurance); Cathy Schoen et al., 
Insured but Not Protected:  How Many Adults Are Underinsured?, HEALTH AFF., June 14, 2005, at W5-
289, W5-293, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/abstract/hlthaff.w5.289v1 (finding 12.3% of 
nonelderly adults underinsured); see also Deborah Gurewich et al., Medical Debt and Consumer Credit 
Counseling Services, 15 J. HEALTH CARE POOR & UNDERSERVED 336, 340 (2004) (noting that about 
75% of those with medical illnesses contributing to financial problems in Florida credit counseling sam-
ple reported having insurance at illness onset, and over half of insured reported having large medical 
debt); KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., CHALLENGES AND 
TRADEOFFS IN LOW-INCOME FAMILY BUDGETS:  IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH COVERAGE (2004), avail-
able at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/4147.cfm (finding insured low income families with medical debt); 
CAROL PRYOR & DEBORAH GUREWICH, ACCESS PROJECT, GETTING CARE BUT PAYING THE PRICE:  
HOW MEDICAL DEBT LEAVES MANY IN MASSACHUSETTS FACING TOUGH CHOICES 6 (2004), available 
at http://www.accessproject.org/downloads/MAreport.pdf (reporting that over 40% in Massachusetts 
community health center user sample had medical debt problems, including almost 30% of those with 
insurance). 
106  See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman, Unmanaged Care:  Towards Moral Fairness in Health Care Cov-
erage, 78 IND. L.J. 659, 661 (2003); William D. White, Market Forces, Competitive Strategies, and 
Health Care Regulation, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 137, 162 (“[T]he net result of these cost sharing strategies 
is to expose employees to large out-of-pocket outlays in the event of serious illness.”); Richard Haugh & 
Dagmara Scalise, A Surge in Bad Debt:  High Co-Pays and Deductibles Mean More Patients Can’t Pay 
Hospital Bills in Full, HOSP. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Dec. 2003, at 14; Reilly, supra note 29, at 7 (stat-
ing that increased cost-sharing is contributing to hospital bad debt). 
107  N = 331 (core plus supplemental homeowner telephone survey sample, weighted).  The group 
that lost coverage amounts to nineteen percent of the telephone survey medical sample.  For the debtors’ 
reasons for losing coverage, see Himmelstein et al., supra note 70, at W5-67 exhibit 3.  Gaps in cover-
age seem to correlate with greater out-of-pocket costs.  In the written questionnaire sample, medical fil-
ers had a higher rate of reporting a gap in insurance than nonmedical filers.  Over a third (38.4%) of 
medical bankruptcy filers in the written questionnaire sample reported at least one month lapse in insur-
ance coverage for anyone in the household.  When evaluating this finding, however, it is important to 
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even remotely representative of filers in other states, variable insurance 
status could complicate the application of Connecticut’s new laws that cali-
brate the required financial treatment to insurance coverage and income.108 
Thus, one substantive limitation of the hospital misbehavior model is 
clear:  the misbehavior model focuses on the chronically uninsured when 
medical-related indebtedness far transcends this group.109  In addition, al-
though policymakers may have good reasons to want to focus on those with 
no insurance, many people do not fit into hard and fast insurance categories. 
C. Non-Hospital Medical Care and Medical-Related Indebtedness 
The hospital misbehavior model focuses on the hospital as the provider 
of medical care and source of expenses.  This results in solutions targeted 
directly to hospitals.  As discussed below, some bankruptcy filers with sig-
nificant medical debt identified hospital bills as their single largest expense, 
but even more struggled with bills from some other medical source. 
Among a subset of the telephone survey medical sample who indicated 
that they incurred a significant medical debt, 42.5% identified hospital bills 
as the single biggest expense.110  Some might fit the profile of the patients 
featured in the news media.  The role of hospital bills must be kept in per-
spective, however.  If 42.5% of these filers identified hospital bills as their 
single biggest expense, that still leaves nearly 60% whose biggest expenses 
were something other than a hospital bill.  For example, as shown in Figure 
4 below, about one fifth (21%) identified prescription drugs as their biggest 
expense.111  Another fifth (20%) identified doctor bills as their biggest ex-
pense.112 
                                                                                                                           
keep in mind that some of those who reported this gap may be uninsured at the time of filing.  Among 
the telephone survey medical sample, ill or injured people with private coverage at illness onset, but who 
later lost it, reported an average of $18,005 in out-of-pocket costs since onset as compared to those 
without any gap ($9898).  See Himmelstein et al., supra note 70, at W5-69 to -70 exhibit 5. 
108  See sources cited supra notes 34–38. 
109  See generally Jeffrey Prottas, Costs, Charges, and Medical Debt:  What is the Real Goal?, 3 
AM. HEART HOSP. J. 39, 41 (2005) (“[The] uninsured suffer the most, but the insured poor also carry a 
heavy burden of debt, and the problem is far from unusual among the middle class . . . .  Focusing on the 
uninsured is a reasonable way to start, but it is clearly inadequate.”); id. at 42 (“Insurance failure is 
clearly contributing to the medical debt problem, perhaps on a scale comparable to the un-insurance 
problem.”).  
110  See supra Figure 4; see also Himmelstein et al., supra note 70, at W5-69. 
111  See id.  Among those filers eligible for Medicare and with psychiatric disorders, prescription 
drugs were the biggest expense for nearly all of them.  See id.  Compare Kenneth M. Langa et al., Out-
of-Pocket Health-Care Expenditures Among Older Americans with Cancer, 7 VALUE HEALTH 186, 191 
(2004) (finding that in a nationally representative study of older Americans, prescription drugs were the 
main source of increased out-of-pocket expenses among people undergoing cancer treatment).  Whether 
or not the elderly will be aided by the Medicare prescription drug bill, see Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2469 (2003), those with 
trouble affording medications are not necessarily Medicare-eligible.  See, e.g., Jae Kennedy & Christo-
pher Erb, Prescription Noncompliance Due to Cost Among Adults with Disabilities in the United States, 
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Source:  2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project (Phone Survey, Valid N = 196) 
 
We were unable to determine through the debtors’ bankruptcy court 
files whether hospitals were especially aggressive users of formal collec-
tion.  The identity of the plaintiffs in lawsuits against debtors is often diffi-
cult to tell from bankruptcy records.  We only can compare the percentage 
of medical-related and non-medical-related cases that identify a lawsuit.  In 
doing so, we find no statistically significant difference between the two 
groups.113  We certainly cannot rule out the possibility that hospitals are 
                                                                                                                           
92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1120, 1123 (2002) (stating that in the sample, twenty-seven percent of those 
with problems paying for drugs were eligible for Medicare). 
112  Himmelstein et al., supra note 70, at W5-69; see also Prottas, supra note 109, at 43 (observing 
that complaints about hospital collection practices may be applicable to other types of medical provid-
ers). 
113  N = 1250 (core sample).  Valid N = 1232.  We compared the filers in the core sample who indi-
cated on question twelve of the written questionnaire that illness or injury was a reason for filing to 
those who did not.  Twenty percent of those filers had one or more lawsuits filed against them in the 
court records, as compared to 17.99% of those who did not indicate illness or injury on the written ques-
tionnaire.  This difference was not statistically significant.  The result does not change if we use a 
broader medical definition from Himmelstein et al., supra note 70, at W5-65, which includes those who 
indicated birth, death, lost work, or medical bills in excess of $1000 within the two years prior to filing.   
Figure 4:  Largest Bills Not Covered by Insurance 
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more aggressive collectors on the basis of this finding.  Yet, it also adds no 
ammunition to the claim that hospitals require special regulation.  
The fact that hospital bills are just one of many types of significant 
medical expense for individuals of modest means should not be surprising.  
For example, consumer out-of-pocket payments to hospitals are a tiny frac-
tion of overall out-of-pocket payments in the United States.114  Doctor visits 
far exceed hospital visits.115  Studies in the medical literature have empha-
sized the role of nonhospital medical expenses when they evaluate cost-
related underuse of health services and drugs.116  In one recent study, the 
overwhelming majority of older Americans in the study reported no out-of-
pocket expenses for hospital or nursing home care, but most had other kinds 
of out-of-pocket medical expenses.117   
Thus, the hospital misbehavior model hits another major limit.  By fo-
cusing on the behavior of a single type of provider in the system, it omits 
consideration of many providers of health services and medications that 
contribute substantially to self-pay obligation, indebtedness, and sometimes 
bankruptcy.  
D. Consumer Credit and Medical-Related Indebtedness 
The hospital misbehavior model often assumes that hospitals remain 
creditors of their patients.  As a result, many of the proposed interventions 
 
114  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:  2004–2005, at 95 
tbls.120–21 (2005) [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT] (reporting $14.7 billion 
in out-of-pocket consumer payments to hospitals, and $212.5 billion overall out-of-pocket payments in 
2002).  Payments to hospitals were less than those to physician and clinical services ($34.2 billion), pre-
scription drugs ($48.6 billion), and nursing home care ($25.9 billion).  Id.  
115  Id. at 109 tbl.154 (reporting 890 million physician office visits as compared to 110.2 million 
emergency department visits and 83.3 million outpatient department visits in 2002). 
116  See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Ellis et al., Suboptimal Statin Adherence and Discontinuation in Primary and 
Secondary Prevention Populations:  Should We Target Patients with the Most to Gain?, 19 J. GEN. 
INTERNAL MED. 638 (2004); Alex D. Federman, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell:  The Status of Doctor-Patient 
Communication About Health Care Costs, 164 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1723 (2004); Dana P. Gold-
man et al., Pharmacy Benefits and the Use of Drugs by the Chronically Ill, 291 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2344 
(2004); Haiden A. Huskamp et al., The Effect of Incentive-Based Formularies on Prescription Drug 
Utilization and Spending, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2224 (2003); Kennedy & Erb, supra note 111; John D. 
Piette et al., Problems Paying Out-of-Pocket Medication Costs Among Older Adults with Diabetes, 27 
DIABETES CARE 384 (2004) [hereinafter Piette et al., Problems Paying Out-of-Pocket Medication 
Costs]; John D. Piette et al., Cost-Related Medication Underuse:  Do Patients with Chronic Illnesses 
Tell Their Doctors?, 164 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1749 (2004) [hereinafter Piette et al., Cost-Related 
Medication Underuse]; Michael A. Steinman et al., Self-Restriction of Medications Due to Cost in Sen-
iors Without Prescription Coverage, 16 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 793 (2001); Robyn Tamblyn et al., Ad-
verse Events Associated with Prescription Drug Cost-Sharing Among Poor and Elderly Persons, 285 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 421 (2001); Rebecca Voelker, When Cost Is an Adverse Drug Effect, Patients Cut 
Corners and Risk Health, 292 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2201 (2004) (summarizing recent studies); Dana G. 
Safran et al., Prescription Drug Coverage and Seniors:  How Well Are States Closing the Gap?, 
HEALTH AFF., July 31, 2002, at W2-53. 
117  See, e.g., Langa et al., supra note 111, at 190. 
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relate to restricting hospitals’ debt collection activity.  This approach inade-
quately takes into account the prominent and growing role that third-party 
credit plays in health care finance.   
About three out of ten (29.3%) cases from the telephone survey medi-
cal sample reported use of credit cards for medical expenses.118  Although 
the data are not sufficiently detailed to determine whether the bills were big 
or small, paid off quickly or strung out over time,119 this percentage alone 
suggests that it is incorrect to simply assume that patients owe their medical 
bills directly to a hospital or other provider.   
Going a significant step beyond unsecured credit, a small proportion of 
debtors mortgaged their homes to pay medical bills as we presented in Fig-
ure 2.120  Among homeowners who had taken second or third mortgages on 
their homes, 15% had taken this step to finance their medical expenses.121  
In the telephone survey medical sample, 13.8% of bankrupt homeowners 
with high cost mortgages cited a medical reason for the loan.122  They have 
taken a trip through bankruptcy and may owe nothing directly to a hospital, 
but these debtors will lose their homes if they do not repay this medical-
related mortgage debt in full.   
Bankruptcy filers are not alone in their use of consumer credit for 
medical expenses.  Nationally representative studies have found families 
using personal loans, credit cards, and mortgages to finance medical bills.123  
 
118  N = 331 (core plus supplemental homeowner telephone survey sample, unweighted).  This figure 
jumps to more than half (51.4%) if the filers with medical problems who charged basic necessities that 
may relate to health or general wellbeing are included.   
119  The narrative accounts revealed some rather large amounts being financed through credit.  For 
example, after insurance did not cover an emergency baby delivery, one new parent charged the entire 
$17,000 bill to a credit card, starting a chain of financial problems.  Consumer Bankruptcy Project 
Comment Index (on file with Northwestern University Law Review).  A family used credit cards to fi-
nance monthly thousands of dollars of medications for a sick child because insurance would pay for 
blood transfusions but not drugs.  A man used credit cards to buy supplies associated with a loved one’s 
cancer treatments.  Another filer reported that she regularly charged her health insurance premiums on a 
credit card.  Id. 
120  See supra Figure 2 (core sample). 
121  See Himmelstein et al., supra note 70, at W5-68 (core plus supplemental homeowners sample).  
In the written questionnaire sample, debtors with a thousand dollars or more in medical bills within the 
two years prior to filing were more likely than others to use a mortgage to finance medical bills (5% ver-
sus 0.8%).  Id.  
122  Id.  A “high cost” mortgage refers here to one with an interest rate above twelve percent, or 
points plus fees of at least eight percent.  Id. 
123  See, e.g., COLLINS ET AL., supra note 105, at 18 (reporting that one fifth of those with medical 
bill problems or medical debts charged large debts to credit cards or used home mortgage); HA T. TU, 
CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, RISING HEALTH COSTS, MEDICAL DEBT AND CHRONIC 
CONDITIONS 3 (2004), available at http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/706/706.pdf (reporting that 
fifty percent of working-age adults with chronic conditions whose families had problems paying medical 
bills in past year had to borrow money to pay); Glenn B. Canner et al., Recent Developments in Home 
Equity Lending, 84 FED. RES. BULL. 241, 248 tbl.8 (1998) (reporting an increase in borrowers indicating 
medical expenses as use for home equity loans); Piette et al., Problems Paying Out-of-Pocket Medica-
tion Costs, supra note 116, at 387 (reporting that 14% of patients in sample, and 23% of those without 
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According to Visa, patients charged $19.5 billion in health care services to 
Visa cards in 2001, which was made possible by the fact that most medical 
practices now accept credit cards.124    
In addition to the use of general purpose credit for medical care, medi-
cal providers may have unpublicized and informal relationships with lend-
ers to provide credit to their patients to finance their care.125  Furthermore, 
lenders offer medical-specific products.  Examples of medical-specific 
credit products and receivables arrangements with providers include the Citi 
Health Card,126 CareCredit (a division of GE Retail Sales Finance),127 Ac-
cessOne,128 MedCash,129 Pxpert,130 the King Thomason Group TotalCare 
Medical Accounts Receivable Credit Card Program,131 the HELPcard,132 
                                                                                                                           
drug insurance coverage, increased credit card debt in order to afford prescription drugs).  Other studies 
have reported the use of consumer credit in categories that have included medical debt.  See, e.g., HUD-
TREASURY TASK FORCE ON PREDATORY LENDING, CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 
31 (2000), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/treasrpt.pdf (citing a National Home 
Equity Mortgage Association survey finding that 30% of subprime home equity loans were used for 
covering medical, educational, and other expenses, as compared to 25% for home improvement and 
45% for debt consolidation); Peter J. Brady et al., The Effects of Recent Mortgage Refinancing, 86 FED. 
RES. BULL. 441, 446 (2000) (reporting that 39% of 1998 and early 1999 refinancings were used for con-
sumer expenditures, which includes medical expenses); JAVIER SILVA, A HOUSE OF CARDS:  
REFINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM (2005), available at http://www.demos-usa.org/pubs/ 
AHouseofCards.pdf (discussing Federal Reserve System Flow of Funds data from 2001–2002 showing 
that 25% of home equity fund were used for consumer expenditures, including medical expenses).  See 
generally HEATHER C. MCGHEE & TAMARA DRAUT, RETIRING IN THE RED:  THE GROWTH OF DEBT 
AMONG OLDER AMERICANS 6 (2004), available at http://www.demos-usa.org/pubs/Retiring_2ed.pdf 
(discussing the role of medical costs in increased credit card debt among older Americans). 
124  See Julie A. Jacob, Credit to Your Practice:  Letting Patients Pay with Plastic, AM. MED. NEWS, 
July 29, 2002, at 13. 
125  See, e.g., Johnson v. Rutherford Hosp., 13 B.R. 185 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981) (involving hospi-
tal that arranged for credit).  See generally Robert W. Seifert, The Demand Side of Financial Exploita-
tion:  The Case of Medical Debt, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 785, 795 (2004).  
126  Citibank Health Card Program, http://www.citibank.com/us/cards/cardserv/healthcrd/cons_ 
benefits.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2005). 
127  See Tyler Chin, Mastercard of Your Own Domain:  Instant Pay, with No Paperwork, AM. MED. 
NEWS, Jan. 12, 2004, at 16 (reporting that GE Sales Finance declined to discuss in detail but said it was 
targeting high-dollar specialty practices); Welcome to CareCredit, http://www.carecredit.com (last vis-
ited Nov. 14, 2005). 
128  See Daniel Costello, Hospital Bills—But with Interest, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2005, at F1 (noting 
that patients who are unable to pay can get credit cards specifically for medical expenses, but that inter-
est rates can reach twenty-three percent); Mike Stobbe, Credit Card Agency Cuts Hospitals’ Losses, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, July 11, 2003, at 1D (discussing AccessOne program); Access One MedCard, 
http://www.accessonemedcard.com (last visited Nov. 14, 2005). 
129  See Michael Unger, Just What the Doctor Ordered:  Schein’s One-Stop Service Ranges from 
Equipment to Personal Finance, NEWSDAY, Dec. 30, 1996, at C7. 
130  See Chin, supra note 127 (stating PracticeXpert program will be targeting patients with poor 
credit histories); Press Release, King Thomason Group Inc., PracticeXpert Launches Pxpert Medical 
Credit Card Program (Aug. 4, 2003), available at http://www.kgth.com/main/News-August42003.htm 
(acquiring delinquent accounts from physician, transferring balance to credit card). 
131  See Press Release, King Thomason Group Inc., King Thomason Group Enters into Agreement 
with Medical Capital Corporation to Market KTG’s TotalCare Medical Accounts Receivable Credit 
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MediCredit,133 and HealthEZ.134  The Federal Trade Commission has noted 
the existence of a “well-established market” for medical-specific loans.135 
This discussion reinforces our concern that an account of medical-
related financial distress that depends on the misbehavior of a specific type 
of provider is unproductive.  Third-party lenders are a significant compo-
nent of health care finance for individuals who are unable to pay the self-
pay portion of medical bills out of current earnings or assets.  Although 
some long-standing and new collection restrictions might apply to third-
party lenders if applied literally, it is far from clear that lawmakers have 
contemplated how to implement their ideas in the context of multipurpose 
credit products.136  From the vantage point of the debtor-creditor system, it 
makes little sense to impose more restrictive collection rights on one kind 
of creditor (hospitals) than on another (third-party lenders) when they are 
owed money from the same population and, at least originally, for the same 
services.137 
E. Income and Medical-Related Indebtedness 
The hospital misbehavior model focuses on the medical-related finan-
cial distress that flows principally from the direct cost of care and, specifi-
                                                                                                                           
Card Program (Apr. 23, 2004), available at http://www.kgth.com/main/News-April232004.htm (citing 
ninety-five percent approval rate for private pay patients).  KTG also offers a structured payment plan as 
an alternative to credit cards.   
132  The HELPcard, http://www.helpcard.com/consumer/helpisprovided.html (last visited Nov. 14, 
2005). 
133  This credit product is used by patients of the Inova Health System, to be distinguished from the 
financier of cosmetic surgery with the same name.  
134  Larry Werner, War Stories About Start-Up Funding Leave ’Em Laughing, MINN. STAR TRIB., 
July 2, 2003, at 1D; HealthEZ Home Page, http://www.healthEZ.com (last visited Nov. 14, 2005) (en-
couraging employers to supplement health plans by adding HealthEZ). 
135  See FTC, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE PART 717, FAIR CREDIT REPORTING–MEDICAL 
INFORMATION 4 (2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/05/040528factacomments.pdf. 
136  The existing statutes that restrict medical debt collection are, in some instances, ambiguous in 
their intent to cover third-party lenders.  See supra notes 33–47 and accompanying text; infra notes 183–
185 and accompanying text.  Yet, applying these restrictions to general purpose lenders will be very dif-
ficult.  For example, open-end consumer credit may be used for medical purposes as well as other ex-
penses and thus will raise a host of tracing problems.  In addition, property exemptions generally restrict 
unsecured creditors that become judgment creditors but not creditors that receive consensual security 
interests.  Thus, it is unlikely that the restrictions would affect the entitlements of mortgage lenders.    
137  See, e.g., Jacoby, Sullivan & Warren, Rethinking the Debates, supra note 68, at 411 (questioning 
whether it is appropriate for consumer credit industry to seek better bankruptcy protection for itself than 
for medical providers).  We recognize that others may see principled reasons to support hospital-based 
restrictions stemming from duties associated with religious or not-for-profit status.  In addition, hospital 
misbehavior may be contributing to the use of third-party credit if hospitals encourage low-income pa-
tients to finance their obligations rather than screen them for charity care.  See, e.g., Hearing on Hospital 
Billing and Collections, supra note 28, at 3 (statement of Rep. Greenwood, Member, House Comm. on 
Energy & Commerce); Prottas, supra note 109, at 41 (observing from a small study of hospital billing 
that the hospital billing process starts with requests for payments, with consideration of discounts possi-
bly arising later). 
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cally, from hospitals’ inappropriate handling of patient accounts.  In this 
section, we explore the important role of income loss, which so often is 
omitted from accounts of medical-related financial distress.   
The bankruptcy data contain several indicia that medical-related in-
debtedness is not just a consequence of direct medical bills.  For example, 
bankruptcy filers sometimes indicate illness or injury as a reason for filing 
even if they do not indicate personal liability for large medical bills.138  As 
noted earlier, about one in five debtors (21%) from the core sample indi-
cated that they had lost at least two weeks’ income because of a medical 
problem.139   
Among those who had identified a medical reason for filing in the tele-
phone survey sample, four out of ten (40.1%) said that medical debt was not 
a factor at all in their decision to file.140  Half (50.8%) said that prescription 
drug costs were not a factor at all.141  But slightly more than seven out of ten 
(71.6%) reported that income loss due to health problems contributed “very 
much” to their bankruptcies and another 8.6% said income loss contributed 
“somewhat” to their bankruptcies.”142   
The long-term diagnoses of the filers reinforce the role that income 
loss may continue to play in their financial outlook.  Slightly over half 
(51.7%) of the medical problems identified in the telephone survey sample 
involved ongoing chronic illnesses, some of which may continue to compli-
cate earning capacity.143  Although we cannot prove that the filers’ health 
conditions made them disabled in accordance with applicable definitions, 
 
138  In the 2001 written survey sample, more than a quarter of all filers in the written questionnaire 
sample identified illness or injury as a reason for filing, whether or not they owed large medical debts.  
See Himmelstein et al., supra note 70, at W5-67 exhibit 2 (N = 1771).  See generally Jacoby, Sullivan & 
Warren, Rethinking the Debates, supra note 68, at 388 (stating that 54.9% of those who said illness or 
injury was a reason for filing for bankruptcy did not identify a current debt to a medical provider). 
139  See supra Figure 2.  N = 1250 (core sample).  The rate is nearly identical (21.3%) if the home-
owner sample is added and weighted into the analysis as well.  See Himmelstein et al., supra note 70, at 
W5-67 exhibit 2. 
140  N = 331 (core plus supplemental homeowner telephone survey sample, unweighted). 
141  N = 331. 
142  N = 331.  The filers’ narrative accounts, even if not representative, also illustrate the range of 
circumstances in which income loss follows both longer-term and acute problems.  For example, open-
heart surgery and its aftermath led to loss of temporary work and a resulting loss of income for one filer. 
See Consumer Bankruptcy Project Phase III Comment Index (on file with Northwestern University Law 
Review).  Others told interviewers they had missed too much work due to chronic illness or hospitaliza-
tions and either could not work out an arrangement with employers or were advised by doctors to take 
different types of jobs.  Doctors ordered bed rest for pregnant women who had been in car accidents or 
who had developed gestational diabetes; one consumed all her allotted family leave before the baby was 
born and soon after was fired.  A number of others explained that they had difficulty receiving their 
workers’ compensation benefits or were receiving benefits at levels far below their prior incomes.  Id. 
143  Himmelstein et al., supra note 70, at W5-69.  For example, more than a quarter (26.6%) reported 
cardiovascular problems as a primary or secondary diagnosis.  Nearly a third had trauma, orthopedic, or 
back and spine problems.  Almost one out of ten (9.5%) reported cancer.  Approximately 10% reported 
diabetes.  Id.  
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only 21.2% of the ill people employed at the time of illness onset in the 
telephone survey medical sample reported that their employer had offered 
them long-term disability insurance coverage,144 and only about 15% of that 
same sample reported actually having some form of long-term disability in-
surance coverage.145   
Complicating the role of income loss is the fact that the bankruptcy fil-
ers often were not themselves ill or injured but lost income while taking 
care of sick relatives.146  Of the bankruptcy filers who had curtailed paid 
employment as a result of a medical problem, more than half (52.8%) did so 
to take care of someone else.147  In 13.3% of the medical bankruptcy cases 
involved in the follow-up telephone survey, primary earners were trying to 
take care of a sick child.148  The filers tell stories of premature births and 
chronically ill or disabled children with constant care needs.  Among those 
in the sample were parents who reported missing months of work when a 
child with spinal bifida required repeated operations, when a baby was born 
with heart defects, or when an infant with sickle cell anemia needed special 
care.149  A parent faced substantial work disruptions because of an autistic 
child, and yet another lost income to deal with an epileptic child.150  A child 
with severe bipolar and anxiety disorder required twenty-four hour monitor-
ing, leading first to significant leaves of absence and eventually to job loss 
for the child’s mother.151  After being told by doctors that their son with 
kidney problems would die, one set of parents moved the entire family to a 
different state with hopes of better treatment and a different prognosis.152  
 
144  N = 391 (core plus supplemental homeowner telephone survey sample, unweighted, measured 
by people instead of cases).  Valid N = 332. 
145  In 15.48% percent of the cases, the ill or injured person reported having disability insurance.  
N = 391 (core plus supplemental homeowner telephone survey sample, unweighted, measured by people 
instead of cases).  Valid N = 241.  Respondents were asked this question only if the ill or injured person 
at issue was employed part-time or full-time by a third party at the time of the illness or injury.  Even if 
some ultimately could prove entitlement to disability payments under one of the Social Security pro-
grams, the level of income replacement would be low and thus would not necessarily forestall major fi-
nancial trouble.  See generally TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE 
WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS:  AMERICANS IN DEBT 158–63 (2000). 
146  See generally B.F. Hughes et al., Pediatric Femur Fractures:  Effects of Spica Cast Treatment 
on Family and Community, 15 J. PEDIATRIC ORTHOPEDICS 457 (1995) (discussing costs of casting for 
femur fractures, including average of three weeks of lost work for parent in families with two working 
parents); Carol E. Smith et al., Efficiency of Families Managing Home Health Care, 73 ANNALS 
OPERATIONS RES. 157 (1997). 
147  See Himmelstein et al., supra note 70, at W5-69. 
148  See id. 
149  See Consumer Bankruptcy Project Phase III Comment Index (on file with Northwestern Univer-
sity Law Review). 
150  Id. 
151  Id. 
152  Id. 
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Some bankruptcy filers reported caring for the children of their seriously ill 
siblings.153   
Other filers reported losing income to care for spouses, aging parents, 
or other relatives.  One man cared for his wife while she battled lung can-
cer, while another went back to work only after his wife had three opera-
tions in six months and finally was able to walk down the hallway of their 
home without his help.154  An adult daughter struggled to help with her 
mother’s medical bills not covered by Medicare and eventually took unpaid 
family leave so she could take her mother for medical treatments.155  Adult 
children temporarily or permanently moved in with parents to help them 
cope with the effects of chronic or terminal illnesses.156  One man cared for 
an uncle with cancer while trying to raise a toddler grandson and assist his 
son with college.157 
The statistics and stories suggest again that structural limitations of 
health care finance—not the misbehavior of any one provider—is the real 
story of medical-related financial distress.  By focusing on the provider, the 
hospital misbehavior model ignores significant indirect costs of illness or 
injury for both the ill person and her extended family.  
F. Summary  
In Part III, we have used data from bankruptcy filings, supplemented 
by other studies, to present a broader picture of the components of medical-
related financial distress.  Allegations of misbehavior should not be ig-
nored.  Yet, a behavioral explanation for a largely structural problem has 
limited utility in the long run.  In Part IV, we put allegations of hospital 
misbehavior within the context of debtor-creditor law.   
IV. A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE ON HOSPITAL MISBEHAVIOR 
The hospital misbehavior model contains three components relating to 
hospital treatment of low-income uninsured patients:  pricing,158 charity care 
and discounts,159 and debt collection tactics.160  The media stories and fol-
 
153  Id.  
154  Id. 
155  Id. 
156  Id. 
157  Id. 
158  See generally ROBERT J. HOBBS ET AL., NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FAIR DEBT COLLECTION 
588–90 (2004) (describing legal challenges to list prices paid by uninsured patients as meeting with 
“mixed success”).  
159  Id. at 590.  This point is bolstered by allegations that hospitals receive millions of dollars in state 
funds to subsidize patients who cannot afford to pay.  See, e.g., Ahmad v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., No. 
(X02)CV040183725S, 2004 WL 2361781 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 2004) (seeking class action and 
alleging that hospital failed to notify patients of eligibility for funds that would have entitled them to 
free care instead of liability and debt collection); Elisabeth Benjamin & Kat Gabriesheski, The Case for 
Reform:  How New York State’s Secret Hospital Charity Care Pool Funds Fail to Help Uninsured and 
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low-up legal interventions have involved unprecedented scrutiny of hospi-
tals’ efforts to collect their bills.161  We focus here principally on debt col-
lection tactics, both because this is our area of study and because the 
indebtedness that triggers collection will persist for many patients even if 
hospitals stop misbehaving in other respects.162   
Again, we do not purport to speak to the tax-related issues surrounding 
not-for-profit providers.  From a debtor-creditor perspective, however, the 
very idea that hospitals misbehave when they engage in formal collection 
activity for legally valid debts conflicts with the existing framework.  No 
matter how distasteful, many of the challenged hospital collection practices 
are legal, common, and even encouraged.  If the practices are beyond what 
our society can tolerate or are thought to be inefficient, then the practices 
should be changed or banned more broadly.163   
Section A looks briefly at how medical providers are encouraged to 
pursue collection through special legal rights.  Section B explains the basis 
for legal liability for medical bills that triggers collection, even in the ab-
sence of special legal rights.   
                                                                                                                           
Underinsured New Yorkers, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 5 (2005); ELISABETH BENJAMIN ET AL., 
LEGAL AID SOC’Y, STATE SECRET:  HOW GOVERNMENT FAILS TO ENSURE THAT UNINSURED AND 
UNDERINSURED PATIENTS HAVE ACCESS TO STATE CHARITY FUNDS (2003), available at 
http://www.legal-aid.org/Uploads/BDCCReport.pdf. 
160  See, e.g., Gibson v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., No. CV980414230S, 2003 WL 22079573 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2003) (alleging that hospital’s collection attempts ran afoul of unfair trade practice 
laws because care was rendered in connection with workers’ compensation claim); CONN. CTR. FOR A 
NEW ECONOMY, YALE, DON’T LIEN ON ME:  THE ATTACK ON HOMEOWNERSHIP BY THE YALE-NEW 
HAVEN HEALTH SYSTEM AND YALE SCHOOL OF MEDICINE (2003), available at http://www. 
ctneweconomy.org/publications.html. 
161  See, e.g., Lagnado, supra note 15; Lagnado, Twenty Years—And He Isn’t Paying Any More, su-
pra note 27.  
162  See, e.g., Prottas, supra note 109, at 41 (“[G]iving the uninsured the same discounts as hospitals 
give insurance companies will remove an injustice without doing justice. . . . A 30% decrease in an un-
payable bill will generally result in a smaller unpayable bill, but the credit implications of an unpaid bill 
are largely independent of its size.”).  Prottas also notes that giving a self-pay patient the same discount 
as Blue Cross/Blue Shield may “still leave an individual family with a bill that leaves them permanently 
in debt with ruined credit and without a hope of ever buying a home.  It is irrelevant to a low-income 
person with health insurance, whose deductible and co-payments leave them in the same situation.”  Id. 
at 43; see also Singer, supra note 21, at 627 (“[EMTALA is] essentially an unfunded mandate, requiring 
hospitals to act but not necessarily compensating them to do so, unless the patient has insurance.  As 
such, it indirectly imposes costs on all of us, at a time when resources might be better deployed toward 
developing a comprehensive system of care.”).  
163  See generally DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE:  A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 
288 (1974); WINTON E. WILLIAMS, GAMES CREDITORS PLAY:  COLLECTING FROM OVEREXTENDED 
CONSUMERS (1998); Richard M. Hynes, Why (Consumer) Bankruptcy?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 121, 140–43 
(2004) (discussing proposals to limit or prohibit formal collection of unsecured debts as a replacement 
for bankruptcy discharge); Arthur Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite—The Dynamics of Coercive Collec-
tion, 80 YALE L.J. 1 (1970); Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 730 (1989); William C. Whitford, A Critique of the Consumer Credit Collection 
System, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 1047.    
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A. Medical-Specific Entitlements and Restrictions 
The idea that hospital debt collection is inappropriate is in tension with 
state laws that give medical providers special debt collection rights.164  The 
most common form of preference for medical providers comes in the form 
of in rem rights in patients’ personal injury lawsuits, settlements, or insur-
ance proceeds.165  Hospital lien laws come in a staggering array of options 
not only in terms of the requirements and limits on lien enforcement, but 
with respect to the range of providers that benefit.  For example, although a 
few states grant these statutory liens to only a subset of hospitals,166 many 
others grant these liens to a wider range of providers, such as ambulance 
services, physicians, nursing homes, nurses, chiropractors, and dentists.167  
Hospital liens generally have been honored and preserved in patients’ bank-
ruptcy cases as long as the providers have complied with applicable state 
statutory requirements.168   
 
164  Although a public choice analysis of these laws is beyond the scope of this Article, we cannot 
rule out the possibility that the hospitals overreached in their advocacy for increased protection.  
165  See, e.g., Trevino v. HHL Fin. Servs., Inc., 945 P.2d 1345 (Colo. 1997); Maynard v. Parker, 369 
N.E.2d 352 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Martinez v. St. Joseph Healthcare Sys., 871 P.2d 1363 (N.M. 1994); 
Hillcrest Med. Ctr. v. Fleming, 643 P.2d 868 (Okla. Civ. App. 1982); Bashara v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp. 
Sys., 685 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1985).  See generally Erik V. Larson & Diana L. Panian, Successfully Dis-
charging Medical Liens in Personal Injury Cases, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 349 (2002); Karen L. Neal, Ten 
Basic Facts to Know—The Texas Hospital Lien Statute, 61 TEX. B.J. 428 (1998); Michael J. Adrian, 
Comment, The Nation’s Medical Quandary Concerning Hospital and Physician Liens:  Who Should 
Pick up the Check?, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 427 (2004); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Physicians’ 
and Surgeons’ Liens, 39 A.L.R.5th 787, 797–98 (1996). 
166  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 4301 (2005) (charitable only); N.Y. LIEN LAW § 189 
(McKinney 2005) (charitable and public); N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-18-01 (2003) (charitable only); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 779.80 (West 2005) (charitable only). 
167  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-46-104 (West 2005) (hospitals, nurses, physicians, and ambu-
lance services); MO. REV. STAT. § 430.225 (2005) (doctors, therapists, chiropractors, hospitals, nurses, 
psychologists, ambulatory surgical facilities, social workers, and professional counselors); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2A:44-36 (West 2005) (hospitals, nursing homes, physicians, and dentists); WASH. REV. CODE § 
60.44.010 (2005) (hospitals, nurses, physicians, and ambulance services).  
168  See, e.g., Rafool v. Associated Anesthesiologists, S.C. (In re Cagle), No. 00-82350, 2002 WL 
750835 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2002) (holding that trustee cannot avoid hospital statutory lien); Barber 
v. Trinity Med. Ctr. (In re Stotler), No. 99-82013, 2001 WL 1851241 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. July 6, 2001) 
(holding that provider’s lien was valid under section 545 of Bankruptcy Code); St. John Med. Ctr. v. In-
nis (In re Innis), 181 B.R. 548 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1995) (upholding hospital lien securing claim of over 
$230,000); In re Pohrman, 146 B.R. 570 (Bankr. D. Or. 1992) (upholding three hospital liens); Benja-
min v. Bd. of Regents (In re Benjamin), No. 92-60183, 1992 WL 12004439 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 
1992); Medcenter One, Inc. v. Dueis (In re Dueis), 130 B.R. 83 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1991) (upholding hospi-
tal lien); St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. v. Nelson (In re Nelson), 92 B.R. 837 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988); Janssen v. 
Wash. Hosp. Ctr. (In re Janssen), 42 B.R. 294 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984) (holding that a hospital lien held 
for longer than ninety days before bankruptcy not avoidable as a preference); In re Shahan, 40 B.R. 608 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984) (holding that lien of hospital district cannot be avoided as preferential transfer, 
but doctor’s lien might be vulnerable); Howard v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr. (In re Howard), 43 B.R. 135 (Bankr. 
D. Md. 1983) (holding lien not avoidable as preferential transfer).  But see Oglesby v. S.E. Neurologic 
Assocs. P.C. (In re Oglesby), Nos. 99-30214, 99-03011A, 2000 WL 33943203 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Sept. 
27, 2000) (holding doctor’s nonstatutory lien avoidable); Malloy v. St. John Med. Ctr. (In re Wood-
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Sometimes state laws give providers or the government statutory liens 
on other kinds of personal property or on real property due to the receipt of 
medical care.  In Idaho, for example, if a patient applies for financial assis-
tance with her hospital bill, this triggers the attachment of an automatic lien 
to any real and personal property and insurance benefits.169  In South Da-
kota, a county gets a statutory lien on real or personal property, then owned 
or thereafter acquired, of a former patient, if the county reimbursed the hos-
pital for the patient’s care.170  Similarly, in New Mexico, a government 
payment to a hospital or health provider on behalf of an indigent patient 
creates a lien against “all real property or interest in real property vested in 
or later acquired by the indigent patient or any person legally responsible 
for his debts . . . .”171  New Jersey imposes a lien on “any goods, rights, 
credits, chattels, moneys or effects” owned or held by the patient who re-
ceives medical care and hospitalization that is compensated by a county.172  
In North Carolina, city- or county-owned or supported ambulance services 
have a special right to attach real property.173  In Oregon, ambulance opera-
tors have a lien on insurance proceeds even if the ambulance ride was not 
precipitated by an accident.174 
Other states permit hospitals to engage in certain kinds of standard debt 
collection, even when those practices are prohibited for other creditors.  For 
example, in North Carolina, public hospitals (and city- or county-owned 
ambulance services) are one of the few kinds of creditors permitted to gar-
nish wages, although the privilege is conditioned on a number of factors.175  
Even some of the bills introduced in state legislatures in the wake of the re-
                                                                                                                           
ward), 234 B.R. 519 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1999) (avoiding liens of hospitals and doctor due to state law 
procedural defects); In re Stoner, No. 96-82060, 1997 WL 33475059 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 1997) 
(avoiding hospital lien using different logic); In re Harris, 50 B.R. 157 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1985) (holding 
that exemption for personal injury proceeds trumps statutory lien); In re Thorogood, 22 B.R. 725 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (assigning smaller amount to hospital lien in settlement with bankrupt patient). 
169  See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 31-3504 (West 2005).  Idaho law also provides that the county board 
may require the medically indigent to work, presumably to pay off their hospital bills.  Id. § 3510A(6).  
See generally Mechling v. Bonner County Office of Assistance (In re Mechling), 284 B.R. 127 (Bankr. 
D. Idaho 2002) (holding that statutory lien could not attach to property acquired by the debtor after dec-
laration of bankruptcy); IHC Hosps., Inc. v. Teton County, 75 P.3d 1198 (Idaho 2003) (reviewing pro-
cedures); KEVIN BORDEN ET AL., DON’T LIEN ON ME:  WHY THE STATE’S MEDICAL INDIGENCY CARE 
PROGRAM IS UNHEALTHY FOR IDAHOANS (2001), available at http://www.accessproject.org/downloads/ 
IdahoLienR.pdf.  
170  See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-8-14 (2005) (emergency and nonemergency hospitalization of in-
digent patient); id. § 25-14-5 (lien right generally); In re Hanson, 164 B.R. 632 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1994); 
Claussen v. Brookings County (In re Claussen), 118 B.R. 1009 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1990) (reviewing South 
Dakota lien law and comparing it to other states’ lien laws). 
171  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-5-14 (West 2005). 
172  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 44:5-19.1, -19.6 (West 2005). 
173  See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44-51.1, -51.5 (2005).  
174  See OR. REV. STAT. § 87.607 (2003). 
175  See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 131E-48 to -51 (2005) (public hospitals); id. § 44-51.4 (county or 
city ambulance service). 
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cent hospital billing and collection scandals would permit hospitals to con-
tinue garnishing wages and attaching bank accounts as long as the hospital 
board so approved.176 
It would be incorrect to interpret the aforementioned special rights as a 
sign that state legislators expect hospitals to refrain from other collection 
activities.  Some have expressly made clear that the lien laws do not pre-
clude ordinary creditor entitlements.  For example, Illinois’s health services 
lien act provides:  
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as limiting the right of a health care pro-
fessional or health care provider, or attorney, to pursue collection, through all 
available means, of its reasonable charges for the services it furnishes to an in-
jured person.  Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a lien holder may 
seek payment of the amount of its reasonable charges that remain not paid af-
ter the satisfaction of its lien under this Act.177  
Nevada’s laws go further to direct the hospitals to engage in collection 
activity:  “Whenever hospital care is furnished to a person on account of an 
injury suffered by the person in a motor vehicle accident, the hospital shall 
use reasonable diligence to collect the amount of the charges for that care 
from the patient or any other person responsible for his support.”178  
Some state laws also facilitate the collection of medical debts by wid-
ening the circle of people who are liable for the debt.  For example, the doc-
trine of necessaries imposes liability on spouses of patients for medical 
care.179  Some state courts have abrogated or abolished the doctrine on con-
stitutional grounds.180  Elsewhere, however, it lives on—principally, some 
 
176  See, e.g., A.O. 2521, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005). 
177  770 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 23/45 (West 2005).  
178  NEV. REV. STAT. § 428.215 (2004). 
179  See, e.g., Sprouse v. City Credits Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (suing patient and 
spouse for $4200 bill); Yale-New Haven Hosp. v. Turcotte, No. CV000434944, 2001 WL 1668993 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2001) (suing patient’s spouse on basis of necessaries statute); Queen’s Med. 
Ctr. v. Kagawa, 967 P.2d 686 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998) (suing almost-divorced spouse for $150,000); MRI 
Coop. v. Berlin, No. 92-T-4712, 1993 WL 257078 (Ohio Ct. App. June 30, 1993) (suing for unpaid 
$103 portion of MRI bill); Trident Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Evans, 454 S.E.2d 343 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995); 
Faulk County Mem’l Hosp. v. Neilan, 269 N.W.2d 121 (S.D. 1978); Outpatient Diagnostic Ctr. v. Chris-
tian, No. 01A01-9510-CV-00467, 1997 WL 210842 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1997) (suing husband, 
who did not agree to be liable, for wife’s care).  But see Cheshire Med. Ctr. v. Holbrook, 663 A.2d 1344 
(N.H. 1995) (holding that hospital first must attempt collection from patient before pursuing spouse); 
Fulton County Health Ctr. v. Underwood, 654 N.E.2d 354 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (holding that hospital 
first must evaluate patient’s ability to pay before pursuing spouse). 
180  See, e.g., N. Ottawa Cmty. Hosp. v. Kieft, 578 N.W.2d 267, 273 (Mich. 1998) (holding that doc-
trine of necessaries no longer part of Michigan’s common law); Schilling v. Bedford County Mem’l 
Hosp., Inc., 303 S.E.2d 905 (Va. 1983) (abolishing doctrine); Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt. v. Lorrain, 675 
A.2d 1326 (Vt. 1996) (abolishing doctrine).  For a complete list, see HOBBS ET AL., supra note 158, at 
141. 
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commentators say, as a basis for collecting medical debt.181  States also may 
have statutes under other names that require family members to help com-
pensate hospitals or government agencies for the cost of an indigent per-
son’s hospital care.182 
Because states offer a laboratory for ways in which to deal with similar 
problems, we also find some state laws that try to protect patients from debt 
collection when they have faced a medical calamity.  For example, several 
states alter individual debtors’ homestead exemptions in the event of ill-
ness.183  Kansas law limits wage garnishment if a debtor is sick and the ill-
ness prevents the debtor from working.184  The most recent entrant into 
 
181  See, e.g., Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., 675 A.2d at 1329 (“Virtually all of the necessaries cases con-
cern hospitals or clinics . . . .”); Shawn M. Willson, Comment, Abrogating the Doctrine of Necessaries 
in Florida:  The Future of Spousal Liability for Necessary Expenses After Connor v. Southwest Florida 
Regional Medical Center, Inc., 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1031, 1043 (1997) (“In the last fifty years, all of 
the Florida cases in which a party invoked the doctrine involved unpaid medical expenses.  In case after 
case, hospitals sought to trap an unwilling spouse into making payment . . . .”). 
182  See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:5-19.9 (West 2005). 
183  West Virginia provides a slightly larger homestead exemption ($7500 instead of $5000) in the 
event of judgments for debts resulting from “catastrophic illness or injury.”  See W. VA. CODE § 38-9-
3(b) (2005) (applying to “all debts and liabilities for hospital or medical expenses incurred from a catas-
trophic illness or injury”).  West Virginia law contains a lengthy and detailed definition of catastrophic 
illness or injury, and the exemption expires upon the death of the debtor.  Id.  Louisiana law protects the 
full value of a home (instead of $25,000) with respect to a debt that arises from “a catastrophic or termi-
nal illness or injury.”  See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20:1 (West 2004).  It defines “catastrophic or terminal 
illness or injury” in terms of both the debt to health providers (more than $10,000) and the percentage of 
the debtor’s adjusted gross income.  Id. at § 20:1(A)(3).  A few states prohibit foreclosure of primary 
residences during the debtor’s lifetime for judgments arising from “health care services and supplies,” 
similar to Medicaid’s approach.  See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 21.095 (2004) (“The primary dwelling, 
including a mobile or manufactured home, of a judgment debtor is exempt from execution upon a judg-
ment for a medical bill . . . .”); OHIO REV. CODE § 2329.66A(1)(a) (2005) (applying to “judgment or or-
der regarding money owed for health care services rendered or health care supplies provided” under 
certain circumstances).  Ohio law specifically provides, however, that the exemption does not apply to 
consensual mortgages arising from similar circumstances.  See id. § 2329.661; see also Wickliffe Coun-
try Place v. Kovacs, 765 N.E.2d 975 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (involving lien filed by a nursing home 
against patient’s real property); Meadow Wind Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. McInnes, No. 1999CA00338, 
2000 WL 1055938, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. July 24, 2000) (holding that debtor is entitled to the exemption 
“if any health care services were rendered or any health care supplies were provided”).  In California, it 
appears that county hospitals may not take liens on real property of patients who are recipients of public 
assistance.  See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 11007, 14112 (West 2005).  In Maine, a hospital may not 
take a lien on a home of a person in a twelve-month period during which the person is eligible for finan-
cial assistance under the state’s catastrophic illness program.  See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 3411 
(2005).  And, most recently, Connecticut increased its homestead exemption from $75,000 to $150,000 
for judgments due to hospitals services under some circumstances.  See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
352b(t) (West Supp. 2005). 
184  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2310(c) (West 2004) (“If any debtor is prevented from working at 
the debtor’s regular trade, profession, or calling for any period greater than two weeks because of illness 
of the debtor or any member of the family of the debtor, and this fact is shown by the affidavit of the 
debtor, the provisions of this section shall not be invoked against any such debtor until after the expira-
tion of two months after recovery from such illness.”).  Ohio briefly limited medical bill garnishment, 
but then quickly repealed it.  See OHIO REV. CODE § 2716.021 (repealed 1995).  See generally Hugh F. 
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patient protection is Connecticut, a state whose laws were explored in Part 
II.185  We cannot find evidence in case law or the published literature that 
individuals who live in these states know about and take advantage of these 
protections, although these sources are not dispositive.  More importantly, 
however, these patient-protection laws often co-exist with laws that give 
health providers strong creditor status in other respects.   
Although somewhat beyond the scope of this discussion of debt collec-
tion laws, we note that federal Medicare-related laws and regulations may 
encourage hospitals to engage in debt collection against not only Medicare 
patients, but against uninsured patients.186  The federal government has 
strenuously denied that laws, regulations, or government representatives 
helped create the current pattern of hospital billing and collection prac-
tices.187  Yet, this response is not entirely credible.  The complex system of 
Medicare-related laws and regulations undoubtedly has helped structure 
hospital-patient financial relationships and must have played some role in 
encouraging or discouraging certain hospital activities.  In any event, we are 
unaware of efforts by the federal government to change these laws or regu-
lations to reduce such effects.  Even now, hospitals trying to improve their 
charity care policies must overcome multiple regulatory hurdles in order to 
put those policies into place.188  Likewise, as mentioned in Part II, some 
state lawmakers have proposed adding collection restrictions applicable to 
medical providers, but to our knowledge none has called for widespread re-
                                                                                                                           
“Trey” Daly III et al., Into the Red to Stay in the Pink:  The Hidden Cost of Being Uninsured, 12 
HEALTH MATRIX 39, 49–51 (2002) (reporting on court challenges to legislation and repeal). 
185  As noted earlier, in the wake of the media attention over the past several years, lawmakers in a 
few states have proposed legislation that would impose more restrictions on hospitals attempting to col-
lect, but most of these bills are unlikely to be enacted.  For example, the Mississippi senate considered a 
bill that would increase property exemptions if the judgments arise from hospital services, but the bill 
received an unfavorable report from the state senate finance committee.  S.B. 2506, 2005 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Miss. 2005).  Several state lawmakers introduced bills that would prohibit hospitals from fore-
closing on the primary residence of a patient.  See, e.g., H.B. 0715, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2004); 
A.O. 2521, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005).  The Florida bill died in committee. 
186  See, e.g., Hearing on Hospital Billing and Collections, supra note 28, at 136 (statement of Lewis 
Morris, Chief Counsel to the Inspector General, Dept. of Health and Human Services) (arguing OIG’s 
legal authorities have limited applicability to uninsured patients and explaining how anti-kickback laws 
and excessive charges exclusion affect uninsured); CAROL PRYOR ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES:  HOW FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND HOSPITAL POLICIES CAN LEAVE 
PATIENTS IN DEBT (2003), available at http://www.accessproject.org/downloads/unintended.pdf.  The 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act is part of this statutory and regulatory picture as well.  See 
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (Supp. 2003).  
187  See Hearing on Hospital Billing and Collections, supra note 28, at 271–80 (Health and Human 
Services’ response to Committee’s request for information); U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVICES, HOSPITAL DISCOUNTS OFFERED TO PATIENTS WHO CANNOT AFFORD TO PAY THEIR 
HOSPITAL BILLS (2004), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/2004/ 
FA021904hospitaldiscounts.pdf. 
188  See, e.g., Hearing on Hospital Billing and Collections, supra note 28, at 95 (written statement of 
Jack Bovender, Hosp. Corp. of Am.) (reporting proposed discount proposal had to go through CMS as 
well as five fiscal intermediaries before implementation). 
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consideration of the special collection treatment already embedded in the 
law.189 
B. General Liability and Debt Collection 
1. Liability.—Special rules aside, the legal system often treats medi-
cal debt like any other contract claim.  Many patients and providers find 
themselves in standard debtor-creditor relationships.190  Often this relation-
ship develops from an express contract between the patient and the hospi-
tal.191  Contract law does not require actual negotiation of the terms of a 
contract, and it generally enforces standard forms drafted by one party.192  
The fact that the terms are not extensively disclosed ordinarily will not de-
feat enforceability.193   
 
189  Arizona revised its hospital lien law to limit its reach.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-931 
(West Supp. 2005); see also Elbert David, Hospitals Accused of Misuse of Lien Law, DES MOINES REG., 
July 15, 2004, at D1 (reporting on lawsuit alleging hospitals use lien law to overcharge accident vic-
tims). 
190  This characterization often arises in subrogation disputes.  See, e.g., Trevino v. HHL Fin. Servs., 
Inc., 945 P.2d 1345, 1348 (Colo. 1997) (describing hospital as patient’s creditor); Maynard v. Parker, 
369 N.E.2d 352, 355 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (stating that hospital recovery involves “ordinary debtor-
creditor relationship”); Bashara v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys., 685 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. 1985) (describ-
ing hospital-patient relationship as debtor-creditor); Lynch v. Deaconess Med. Ctr., 776 P.2d 681, 684 
(Wash. 1989); Porter v. McPherson, 479 S.E.2d 668, 673, 675 (W. Va. 1996). 
191  See, e.g., Crawford v. Credit Collection Servs., 898 F. Supp. 699, 701 (D.S.D. 1995) (holding 
that patient authorization agreement is a contract for purposes of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act); 
Milford Hosp. v. Champeau, No. CV00069269S, 2001 WL 497110 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 2001) 
(finding, on summary judgment, that plaintiff failed to prove duress regarding authorization form obli-
gating patient to pay charges, collection costs, and attorneys’ fees); Sholkoff v. Boca Raton Cmty. 
Hosp., Inc., 693 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (involving admission form imposing highest in-
terest rate permitted by law if patient did not pay within forty-five days); Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Carr, 297 
So. 2d 598 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (involving form requiring payment of unpaid balance and seven 
percent interest); Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp. v. Armlin, 536 N.Y.S.2d 272 (App. Div. 1989) (holding that 
guarantee of payment for eye surgery imposed liability, notwithstanding belief that study would cover 
expenses); McCarthy v. Weaver, 472 N.Y.S.2d 64, 65 (App. Div. 1984) (involving form obligating pa-
tient “to pay all costs, charges and expenses of the hospital of every kind and description”); Healthline v. 
Sturdevant, 779 P.2d 624, 625 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (involving express promise to pay for son’s care “in 
accordance with the rates and terms of the hospital”).  But see Bondanza v. Peninsula Hosp. & Med. 
Ctr., 590 P.2d 22 (Cal. 1979) (holding that form requiring payment of all reasonable attorney fees and 
collection costs did not entitle hospital to include collection costs amounting to thirty-three percent of 
bill); Payne v. Humana Hosp. Orange Park, 661 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding express 
contract enforceable but compensation may be limited because amount of charges not addressed within 
four corners of document).  For attempts to use duress and related defenses to a breach of contract claim 
on a hospital bill, see HOBBS ET AL., supra note 158, at 138. 
192  See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Elec-
tronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 435–36 (2002); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver 
Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 
172 (2004) (“[The] norm in contract law is consent to the unknown.”). 
193  Most of the few courts and commentators that have dealt with this issue seem to conclude that 
these agreements are not subject to truth-in-lending disclosure laws. See Finnegan v. Univ. of Rochester 
Med. Ctr., 21 F. Supp. 2d 223 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding Fair Credit Billing Act not applicable); Bright 
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Even if a court later concludes that a hospital admissions form is an in-
sufficient basis to establish contractual liability to pay a particular price, pa-
tients likely owe money to providers.  For example, the Tennessee Supreme 
Court found that a hospital admission form that inadequately defines the 
charges cannot form the basis of patient liability for hospitals’ list prices.194  
Yet the court still found the patient personally liable for reasonable charges 
under theories of quasi-contract or unjust enrichment.195  “Reasonable 
charges” were to be determined by considering a hospital’s internal cost 
factors and the charges of other hospitals in the community.196  Other cir-
cumstances that might defeat express contract enforceability, such as the 
complete absence of a signature on a hospital admission form, might none-
theless result in liability for a patient on the grounds of unjust enrichment if 
she received health care for which she did not pay.197  Even in the absence 
of express contract or an unjust enrichment claim, patients may be liable in 
                                                                                                                           
v. Ball Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 152 (S.D. Ind. 1979), aff’d, 616 F.2d 328 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(holding that late charge did not extend credit, and thus was not in violation of Regulation Z); Defen-
dant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Partial Judgment on 
the Pleadings, Finck v. Fairfield Med. Ctr. (S.D. Ohio Jan. 9, 2004) (C-2-03-884) (arguing that defen-
dant was not a creditor under truth-in-lending laws, and that a handling charge was not a finance 
charge); Linda Galler, Note, Subjecting Hospitals to Truth in Lending Disclosure Requirements:  Bright 
v. Ball Memorial Hospital, 8 AM. J.L. & MED. 69 (1982) (advocating change so that hospitals comply 
with truth-in-lending laws); Thomas S. Lucksinger & Kemp W. Gorthy, Perils and Prerogatives of Col-
lection Laws, Part 2:  Collecting Indebtedness, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Mar. 1979, at 18; cf. Hahn v. 
Hank’s Ambulance Serv., Inc., 787 F.2d 543 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that ambulance company late 
charge was not an extension of credit subject to truth-in-lending laws); Johnson v. Rutherford Hosp. (In 
re Johnson), 13 B.R. 185 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981) (involving a hospital conceding that it violated 
truth-in-lending laws after arranging for bank to make loan to patient without making proper disclo-
sures); Richard M. Alderman, The Business of Medicine—Health Care Providers, Physicians, and the 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 109, 138 (1989) (discussing application of Texas de-
ceptive trade law to medical bills); James H. Backman, Consumer Credit and the Learned Professions of 
Law and Medicine, 1976 BYU L. REV. 783. 
194  See Doe v. HCA Health Servs. of Tenn., Inc., 46 S.W.3d 191 (Tenn. 2001) (affirming appeals 
court’s holding that indefinite agreement in hospital form to pay “charges” did not establish contract to 
pay hospital’s secret list prices). 
195  Id. at 198. 
196  Id. at 198–99.  See generally HOBBS ET AL., supra note 158, at 139. 
197  See, e.g., Cardiology Assocs. of Fairfield County, P.C. v. Sussman, No. CV970162007, 2000 
WL 872492 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 16, 2000); Bingham Mem’l Hosp. c. Boyd (In re Boyd), 8 P.3d 664 
(Idaho Ct. App. 2000) (holding that hospital could collect unjust enrichment from deceased patient’s es-
tate); Galloway v. Methodist Hosps., Inc., 658 N.E.2d 611 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (permitting recovery in 
quantum meruit after patient’s husband failed to sign financial liability statement during emergency 
premature delivery); Credit Bureau Enters., Inc. v. Pelo, 608 N.W.2d 20 (Iowa 2000) (permitting recov-
ery in quantum meruit after patient hospitalized for emergency mental condition refused to sign insur-
ance release); Heartland Health Sys., Inc. v. Chamberlin, 871 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (allowing 
hospital to collect from patient in unjust enrichment after he was brought to hospital unconscious, and 
from patient’s mother on express contract theory); Layton Physical Therapy Co. v. Palozzi, 777 N.E.2d 
306 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002); Dallas County Hosp. Dist. v. Wiley, No. 05-01-01031, 2002 WL 1286515 
(Tex. App. Jan. 12, 2002) (remanding for consideration of quantum meruit after holding hospital lien 
does not attach to uninsured motorist insurance proceeds).  See generally HOBBS ET AL., supra note 158, 
at 138. 
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implied contract.198  An unsigned form, or a form signed by a patient who 
cannot read and understand it, also might lead to a finding of an implied 
promise to pay for care.199  
Of course, not all patient-provider relationships devolve into longer-
term debtor-creditor relationships.200  Nonetheless, it remains the case that 
 
198  See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 16-4C-11 (2005); see also infra note 199 and sources cited therein. 
199  See, e.g., Shellnut v. Randolph County Hosp., 469 So. 2d 632 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985) (implying 
that hospital was entitled to reasonable and customary fees for services even absent express contract); 
Yale-New Haven Hosp., Inc. v. Gargiulo, No. CV980419980, 1999 WL 989422 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 
18, 1999) (finding, on motion to strike defenses, implied agreement between hospital and patient (as-
suming that bill of hospital was reasonable and customary), and observing that issue of hospital’s miti-
gation of damages through Hill-Burton or other financial aid opportunities may arise later); Sherman 
Hosp. v. Wingren, 523 N.E.2d 220 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (implying that contract theory entitles hospital to 
reasonable and customary charges); Cuyahoga County Hosps. v. Price, 581 N.E.2d 1125 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1989) (holding patient who could not read or understand form liable under implied contract theory be-
cause he reasonably knew hospital expected payment for provided care); Porter v. McPherson, 479 
S.E.2d 668, 673–74 (W. Va. 1996) (permitting hospital to collect based on express or implied contract 
for reasonable value of services).  
200  Some states’ versions of Medicaid or a true HMO sharply limit patients’ personal liability.  See 
Yale-New Haven Hosp. v. Vignola, No. CV000444787S, 2002 WL 377675 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 
2002) (holding that hospital has duty to determine applicability of insurance coverage to hospital proce-
dure).  See generally Gail B. Agrawal, Chicago Hope Meets the Chicago School, 96 MICH. L. REV. 
1793, 1796 (1998) (reviewing MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS:  THE LAW, 
ETHICS, AND ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS (1997)) (explaining that managed care elimi-
nates patient’s responsibility for coinsurance and deductibles for covered treatments).  A patient found 
eligible for a full account write-off under a hospital’s own charity care policy should not owe any 
money, although providers sometimes have insufficient information to determine charity care eligibility 
until later in the collection process.  See, e.g., Ray B. Lefton, Developing Organizational Charity-Care 
Policies and Procedures, HEALTH CARE FIN. MGMT., Apr. 2002, at 52, 54–55; PATIENT FRIENDLY 
BILLING PROJECT, supra note 48, at 15 (noting possibility of collection agencies returning accounts that 
turn out to qualify for charity care).  Medical providers may attempt to run a cash-only business or to 
collect the sum before the patient receives care or leaves the building, quickly terminating the debtor-
creditor aspect of the relationship.  See, e.g., Robert Geer, Improving Collections in the ED, PATIENT 
ACCTS., Oct. 2003, at 1; Mary Chris Jaklevic, All Cash, All the Time, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Jun 23, 2003, 
at 40; Mike Norbut, Money Woes Solved with Cash-Only Practice, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 10, 2003, at 
19.  Like any other creditor, providers sometimes discourage patients from challenging bills in the hopes 
of receiving prompt payment.  See, e.g., Kimberly Elsbach, Robert I. Sutton, & Kristine E. Principe, 
Averting Expected Challenges Through Anticipatory Impression Management:  A Study of Hospital Bill-
ing, 9 ORG. SCIENCE 68, 79–80 (1998) (noting that bureaucratic barriers, threats of outside debt collec-
tors, and suggestions that audits could lead to higher bills discourage bill challenges).  “Patient-friendly 
billing” projects are underway to limit disputes and to encourage quick bill satisfaction.  See PATIENT 
FRIENDLY BILLING PROJECT, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N, PATIENT FRIENDLY BILLING:  MAKING 
PATIENT BILLS CLEAR, CONCISE, CORRECT, AND PATIENT FRIENDLY 4–6 (2003), available at 
http://www.patientfriendlybilling.org/pdf/BrochureJune03.pdf; Donell Cohen & Paul Hoffman, When 
Putting Patients First Fits the Bill:  One Hospital Shows How a Change in Billing Format Can Reduce 
Costs and Improve Patient Satisfaction, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Sept. 2003, at 90; Robert Lowes, 
When You Ask for Payment, Do it Right!, MED. ECON., Jan. 10, 2003, at 58; Terry Allison Rappuhn, The 
Revenue Cycle from the Patient’s Perspective:  Improve Your Revenue Cycle by Tailoring Patient Fi-
nancial Communications to Meet Patient Needs, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Sept. 2003, at 64; see also 
Mary Chris Jaklevic, Billing Question?:  Point and Click; Mich. System Among Few Offering Online 
Account Access, MOD. HEALTHCARE, July 22, 2002, at 23. 
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patients often bear personal liability for some of their direct medical 
costs.201  Indeed, some currently popular health care finance approaches are 
based on the belief that liability is desirable to prevent medical care overuse 
and to promote cost containment.202  Liability means legal enforceability, 
and enforceability has collection-related consequences regardless of the 
creditor’s identity.203    
2. General Debt Collection Entitlements.—In the absence of special 
privileges or restrictions, debtor-creditor law gives creditors (including 
medical providers) basic rights to enforce legal obligations.  They have col-
lection rights whether or not they are in the business of extending credit and 
whether or not they are not-for-profit institutions.  
In attempting to collect overdue bills, creditors’ procedures often start 
with informal attempts to collect before resorting to formal legal action.204  
For example, outside debt collectors coax repayment through telephone and 
written contact.205  The laws generally prohibit excessive harassment but 
leave even third-party collectors wide latitude as they pursue nonpaying 
debtors.206  This includes calling up until 9 p.m., making contact on holi-
days, talking to debtors’ children who might pick up the phone in the late 
afternoon, and threatening a wide range of consequences for nonpayment.207   
 
201  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 114, at 93 tbl. 115 (reporting 
that of $819.7 billion in health services and supply expenditures, $212.5 billion was out-of-pocket pay-
ments).  
202  See, e.g., First Hearing in a Series on Tax Exemption:  Pricing Practices of Hospitals Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 53 (2004) (statement of 
Regina Herzlinger, Harvard Business Sch.), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_house_hearings&docid=f:99670.pdf; Robert Kaestner, Publicly Provided 
Health Insurance for the Nonelderly Poor:  Can We Save Money Safely?, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 97–
98, 102–103.  
203  Thus, the National Consumer Law Center advises that a “very effective method to deal with 
medical debt is to find someone else to pay for it.”  HOBBS ET AL., supra note 158, at 576. 
204  See, e.g., WILLIAMS,  supra note 163, at 40 (“There is ample evidence that creditors believe that 
the informal or non-judicial collection process is their most cost-effective remedy.  Virtually no institu-
tional lender is without its collection department and independent collection agencies supplement the 
work of these departments and serve the needs of smaller creditors.”). 
205  See, e.g., Ronald Paul Hill, Bill Collectors and Consumers:  A Troublesome Exchange Relation-
ship, 13 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 20, 21 (1994); Anat Rafaeli & Robert I. Sutton, Emotional Contrast 
Strategies as Means of Social Influence:  Lessons from Criminal Interrogators and Bill Collectors, 34 
ACAD. MGMT. J. 749, 755 (1991) (“[D]ata from one month suggested that collectors obtained substantial 
payments from 60% of debtors who were 35 to 64 days late and from 25% of debtors who were 155 to 
184 days late.”). 
206  See generally Rafaeli & Sutton, supra note 205.  In addition to the Fair Debt Collection Prac-
tices Act, state debt collection laws, unfair or deceptive trade practices, and other laws may apply.  Id. at 
581–82.   
207  See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, ALL YOUR WORTH:  THE ULTIMATE 
LIFETIME MONEY PLAN 251–52 (2005) (discussing debt collection tactics, including communication 
with children).   
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Like other creditors, health care providers long have used debt collec-
tors.208  Both collections experts and provider management experts have 
written frequently about how to decrease bad medical debt,209 how to decide 
between in-house collection and outsourcing,210 how and when to deploy 
secondary collection agencies after primary placements have failed,211 and 
how to increase revenues through the outright sale of patient accounts to 
third parties.212  Although patients sometimes challenge the billing and col-
 
208  See, e.g., Bobette Gustafson, The Collector Inspector:  Self-pay Trends Necessitate More Effec-
tive RFPs, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Dec. 2003, at 46 (2003) (“[A]bout 80 percent of ACA Interna-
tional’s 3,125 member agencies provide some level of collection services to the healthcare industry.”).  
For examples in cases, see Smith v. Computer Credit, Inc., 167 F.3d 1052, 1053 (6th Cir. 1999) (debt 
collection by letters); Lockard v. Equifax, Inc., 163 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir. 1998) (use of collection 
agencies); Bryant v. Bonded Accounts Service/Check Recovery, No. Civ. 00-1072 RHKJMM, 2000 WL 
34494806 (D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2000) (medical debt collection letter); Sprouse v. City Credits Co., 126 F. 
Supp. 2d 1093 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (same); Lara v. Kern County Board. of Supervisors, 130 Cal. Rptr. 668, 
670 (Ct. App. 1976) (describing longstanding practice of counties in California to have agreements with 
debt collectors for patient hospital debts); Georgia Public Service Commission v. Charles H. Turner, 
Inc., 407 S.E.2d 113 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (permitting medical debt collector to use automatic dialing 
service with recorded messages); Forsyth Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Contreras, 421 S.E.2d 167 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1992) (medical debt collection letter); Weiss v. Collection Center, Inc., 667 N.W.2d 567, 569–
70 (N.D. 2003) (describing medical debt collector’s practice).  See also Opinion Letter from Fed’l Trade 
Comm’n Bureau of Consumer Protection to Thomas Isgrigg (November 10, 1992) (advising business 
that has collected delinquent hospital bills in Los Angeles County for twelve years), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fdcpa/letters/isgrigg1.htm. 
209  See, e.g., Lynn Degrote, Lowering Bad Debt in Health Care:  The Cure is Easier than You 
Think, CLINICAL LEADERSHIP & MGMT. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2002, at 59 (advocating Internet services to 
reduce bad debt); Tom Jajny, The What, Why and When of Collecting Patient Balances, MED. PRACTICE 
MGMT., July–Aug. 2003, at 33; Robert Kazel, Getting Patients to Pay:  Gentle Ways to Get the Check, 
AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 22, 2003, at 14; Scott W. Sankary & Nick H. Kupferle III, Make Collections 
Your Goal:  Summit Healthcare Case Studies, MGMA CONNEXION, Jan. 2003, at 40; see also Opinion 
Letter from Fed’l Trade Comm’n Bureau of Consumer Protection to J. Russell Gibson, III (February 21, 
1990) (discussing application of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act to medical “pre-collection” activi-
ties), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fdcpa/letters/gibson90.htm. 
210  See, e.g., J. Mantone, Letting Someone Else Do It Better:  Outsourcing Business Functions Can 
Mean Higher Revenue, but Not Costs, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Nov. 24, 2004, at S10; Maria H. Seman & 
Elizabeth M. Guyton, Three Steps for Optimizing Self-Pay Outsourcing, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Oct. 
2004, at 42; William C. Sturm & Gregory J. Naples, Hospital-Owned Collection Agencies:  Concerns 
and Considerations, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Dec. 1986, at 34. 
211  See, e.g., Robert M. Frohlich, Effective Reassignment of Accounts Can Decrease Bad Debt, 
HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., July 1994, at 36, 37. 
212  See, e.g., HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N, BAD DEBT RISING:  WHEN TO SELL YOUR 
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE (2004), available at http://www.hfma.org/FeaturedTopic/resource/bad_debt. 
pdf; Gustafson, supra note 208.  Health services researchers and advocacy groups now study and track 
use of collection agencies for patient accounts.  See, e.g., MAY & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 105 (stating 
that in nationally representative study, more than sixty percent of families with medical bill problems 
reported being contacted by collection agencies); PRYOR & GUREWICH, supra note 105, at 7 (stating that 
almost two-thirds of those with medical debt in study reported being contacted by collection agency); 
TU, supra note 123 (stating that sixty-four percent of those with chronic conditions reported being con-
tacted by collection agency); S. Felt-Lisk, M. McHugh, & E. Howell, Monitoring Local Safety-Net Pro-
viders:  Do They Have Adequate Capacity?, 21 HEALTH AFF. 277, 279 (Sept. 2002) (tracking collection 
activities used against uninsured patients in survey of safety net providers in five cities); Thomas P. 
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lection practices of hospitals under consumer laws, we have found few 
cases when such challenges have been successful.213 
Although some kinds of creditors have found informal collection to be 
efficient and effective, creditors have the right to file a lawsuit when infor-
mal techniques are unavailing.  Indeed, it is the possibility of legal action 
that encourages voluntary payment of most obligations.  Thus, medical pro-
viders who are owed money from their patients act within their basic legal 
rights when they sue.214  Generally, it is not very difficult for a provider to 
show that the patient received care, was liable for care, and failed to pay.215   
State laws have extensive judgment collection procedures precisely for 
the purpose of giving a creditor options for satisfying an obligation once a 
                                                                                                                           
O’Toole et al., Medical Debt and Aggressive Debt Restitution Practices:  Predatory Billing Among the 
Urban Poor, 19 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 772, 774 (2004) (noting that nearly forty percent of sample re-
ported being referred to debt collection agency for medical debt even though average annual income of 
sample was less than $8000). 
213  See, e.g., Edwards v. McCormick, 136 F. Supp. 2d 795 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (rejecting class certifi-
cation for action against debt collector for medical debt collection practices, including threat of foreclo-
sure on judgment lien); Yale-New Haven Hosp. v. DeMatteo, No. CV 970407311S, 1998 WL 563817 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 1998) (striking patient’s counterclaim that hospital violated the state’s Credi-
tor’s Collection Practices Act); Franklin Collection Serv., Inc. v. Stewart, 863 So. 2d 925 (Miss. 2003) 
(dismissing with prejudice debtors’ fraud on the court and abuse of process actions against collection 
agency that pursued open medical accounts); Witherwax v. Transcare, Inc., No. 114065/03, 2005 WL 
1458061 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 22, 2005) (dismissing action brought by patient on FDCPA grounds as trial 
court found and appellate court affirmed that defendant was a creditor, not a debt collector); Forsyth 
Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Contreras, 421 S.E.2d 167 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that summary judgment 
was properly granted in favor of hospital where patient alleged violation of debt collection laws stem-
ming from collection letters patient claimed were misleading).  But see Bryant v. Bonded Accounts Ser-
vice/Check Recovery, No. Civ. 00-1072 RHKJMM, 2000 WL 34494806, (D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2000) 
(finding that an unsophisticated consumer could reasonably interpret the collection letters defendant sent 
as denying credit and thus medical care); Bondanza v. Peninsula Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 590 P.2d 22 (Cal. 
1979) (forcing patient to pay collection agency’s commission of one-third the balance constituted 
unlawful and unfair business practice); Bundren v. Superior Court,193 Cal. Rptr. 671, 676 (Ct. App. 
1983) (observing that there was a “serious question as to whether hospital’s method of seeking pay-
ment” was reasonable since the patient was still in the hospital and recovering from surgery at the time 
the hospital sought payment); Summa Health Sys. v. Viningre, 749 N.E.2d 344 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) 
(holding that even though transactions between doctors and patients are exempted from the Consumer 
Sales Practices Act, transactions between a medical service provider, like a hospital, and a patient are 
not clearly exempted).  The recent round of lawsuits that make slightly different allegations, namely 
profiteering due to the amount of the charges, have so far been unsuccessful as well.  See generally 
STAITI, HURLEY & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 48 (reporting on lack of success of class action lawsuits). 
214  See supra notes 183–192 and accompanying text (setting forth examples of theories of liability 
in lawsuits against patients); see also MED. BILLING TASK FORCE, supra note 55. 
215  See, e.g., Wash. County Mem’l Hosp. v. Hattabaugh, 717 N.E.2d 929 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (find-
ing statement of charges for hospital or other health care expenses constitutes prima facie evidence that 
charges are reasonable and remanding to charge prejudgment interest of eight percent).  A factual dis-
pute on the reasonableness of the charge may preclude summary judgment, however.  See, e.g., Yale-
New Haven Hosp. v. Turcotte, No. CV000434944, 2001 WL 1668993 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2001).  
For strategies used to challenge amount of liability, see, for example, HOBBS ET AL., supra note 158, at 
587. 
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judgment has been rendered.216  A combination of state and federal laws 
protect some property and future income from the reach of judgment credi-
tors, as the prior discussion of medical-specific laws suggested.217  But 
judgment creditors are otherwise legally entitled to obtain liens on patients’ 
homes or cars,218 garnish patients’ wages,219 and attach patients’ bank ac-
counts.220  In most instances, collection law is the same whether the debt 
was incurred for a trip to the Bahamas or to the emergency room of the lo-
cal hospital.  If a debtor files for bankruptcy, she may be able to remove ju-
 
216  See generally William J. Woodward Jr., Enforcements of Money Judgments:  Objectives and Re-
strictions, in 9 DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW 37-24 (Theodore Eisenberg ed., 1990). 
217  Id.  Nothing precludes debtors from voluntarily parting with property, leaving room for creditors 
to encourage debtors to sell property voluntarily to pay bills.  See, e.g., Ellis Hosp. v. Little, 409 
N.Y.S.2d 459 (App. Div. 1978). 
218  See, e.g., Edwards v. McCormick, 136 F. Supp. 2d 795, 798 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (involving a debt 
collector who filed a judgment lien which created a lien on patient’s real property); Wickliffe Country 
Place v. Kovacs, 765 N.E.2d 975, 977 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (involving a nursing home that filed judg-
ment lien against nursing home resident’s real property and filed a complaint to foreclose on the lien); 
Meadow Wind Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. McInnes, No. 1999CA00338, 2000 WL 1055938, at *1 (Ohio 
Ct. App. July 24, 2000) (involving a health care center which filed a complaint for foreclosure of pa-
tient’s real property); Landmark Med. Ctr. v. Gauthier, 635 A.2d 1145, 1146–47 (R.I. 1994) (involving a 
medical center that obtained default judgment against patient and issued an execution against patient’s 
real estate). 
219  See Van Wert Co. Hosp. v. French (In re Cummings), 266 B.R. 138, 140 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
2001) (wages garnished to pay hospital bills); Williams v. Baptist Health Sys., Inc., 857 So. 2d 149, 150 
(Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (involving a hospital’s attempt to garnish patient’s mother’s wages after obtaining 
default judgment against patient and patient’s mother); Yale-New Haven Hosp., Inc. v. Richardson, No. 
CV000439636S, 2001 WL 984731, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 26, 2001) (wages garnished to pay hos-
pital bills); Christian v. M & R Collection Adjustment, Inc., 307 S.E.2d 523, 523–24 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1983) (same); A.C. White Transfer & Storage Co., Inc. v. Grady Mem’l Hosp., 261 S.E.2d 476, 477 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (same); Saint Elizabeth Cmty. Health Ctr. v. Penrod, No. A-02-789, 2004 WL 
1091926, at *1–2 (Neb. App. May 18, 2004) (defendant’s wages garnished to pay hospital bills of father 
of defendant’s children); Blake v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 498 S.E.2d 41 (W.Va. 1997) (wages 
garnished to pay hospital bills); Kenosha Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Garcia, 683 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Wis. 
2004) (involving hospital’s motion for a judgment against patient’s employer for full amount of patient’s 
debt after employer failed to respond to notice of garnishment of patient’s wages); see also CONN. CTR. 
FOR A NEW ECONOMY, supra note 160; Susan D. Kovac, Judgment-Proof Debtors in Bankruptcy, 65 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 675 (1991) (showing that in study of Tennessee debtors in 1980s, over one-fifth of 
those with medical debt were subject to garnishments); Sidney D. Watson, Commercialization of Medi-
caid, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 53, 61 (2001) (“Welfare medicine breaks down when . . . the hospital, which 
runs the clinic and receives over seventeen million dollars a year for indigent care, garnishes the mini-
mum wage salary of a young mother who forgot, in the midst of a nighttime medical crisis, to bring her 
two year old son’s Medicaid card with her to the emergency room.”).  See generally Woodward, supra 
note 216.   
220  See, e.g., Harris v. Bailey, 574 F. Supp. 966 (W.D. Va. 1983) (involving garnishment of a pa-
tient’s bank account which was solely comprised of Social Security benefits); Hosp. of St. Raphael v. 
New Haven Sav. Bank, 534 A.2d 1189 (Conn. 1987) (involving hospital’s attempt to garnish bank ac-
counts of debtor even though debtor had closed those accounts and received teller’s checks for them); 
Morristown Mem’l Hosp. v. Caldwell, 775 A.2d 34 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (involving hospi-
tal’s motion for turnover of patient’s assets in bank account); Grant Hosp. v. O’Nail, No. 96APE06-793, 
1997 WL 101657 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 4, 1997) (involving garnishment of joint bank accounts to satisfy 
hospital debts); Ingram v. Hocking Valley Bank, 708 N.E.2d 232 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (same). 
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dicial liens from homes221 or free wages from garnishment.222  But this relief 
is available only if the circumstances satisfy the technical statutory stan-
dards in the Bankruptcy Code, not because the provider or creditor engaged 
in wrongdoing.223  
The creditor will have even greater collection rights if the debtor has 
given a creditor a consensual security interest in property, whether to secure 
a medical-related obligation or for some entirely different purpose.224  
Creditors with security interests in personal property, such as cars, may be 
able to seize and privately sell the collateral without any court proceedings 
or intervention.225  The process for real property varies by state and likely 
will be a bit more complex, but the mortgage lender generally will not be 
hindered by property exemptions.226 
Whether or not it pursues formal collection for a debt, a creditor may 
be inclined to participate in the credit reporting system.  The credit report-
ing system, governed largely by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, alerts other 
creditors, insurers, landlords, and even employers to unpaid debts and re-
lated collection activity.227  The available data suggest that some medical 
 
221  See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (2000) (allowing avoidance of judicial liens to the extent they impair 
property exemptions); see also Hughes v. Marshall Mem’l Hosp. (In re Hughes), No. EO-98-086, 1999 
WL 232672 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Apr. 15, 1999) (reversing and remanding denial of debtor’s motion to 
avoid hospital’s judicial lien); In re Schwartz, No. 92-32725-S-7, 1993 WL 405010 (N.D. Ohio June 18, 
1993) (involving hospital lien already avoided); In re Patterson, 275 B.R. 578 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2002) 
(involving hospital lien for over $16,000); In re Freeman, 259 B.R. 104 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2001) (involving 
hospital lien securing debt of over $28,000, but with interest, exceeding $47,000); In re Groff, 223 B.R. 
697 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1998) (involving lien for over $13,000); In re Cardwell, 128 B.R. 427 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 1991) (seeking to avoid hospital and doctor liens); McCullough v. IRS (In re McCullough), 122 
B.R. 251 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (involving hospital judicial lien avoided); In re Owens, 67 B.R. 418, 
420 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (same); In re Wolf, 58 B.R. 354 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (involving four 
liens, including two hospital liens with twenty percent interest); In re Marino, 27 B.R. 282 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ind. 1983) (involving ten liens, including two hospital liens).  But see Anderson v. Blair (In re Blair), 
No. 99-08835-W, 2000 WL 33710889 (Bankr. D.S.C. June 27, 2000) (involving hospital lien already 
paid at time of sale); Barzee v. Trammel (In re Trammel), 63 B.R. 878 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986) (trying 
unsuccessfully to avoid hospital’s judicial lien on property the filer no longer owned). 
222  See, e.g., In re Vasquez, 205 B.R. 136 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997); In re Rodriguez, 140 B.R. 562 
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1992); Stoffer v. St. Mary’s Hosp. Sisters (In re Stoffer), 103 B.R. 1008 (Bankr. C.D. 
Ill. 1986).  But see Johnston Mem’l Hosp. v. Hess, 44 B.R. 598 (W.D. Va. 1984) (honoring hospital’s 
judgment lien even though debtor did not own property at time of writ). 
223  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (2000). 
224  See generally JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:  
SECURED TRANSACTIONS (5th ed. 2000). 
225  U.C.C. § 9-609 (2001) (permitting secured creditor to take possession of collateral after default); 
id. § 9-610 (permitting disposition of collateral through commercially reasonable private sale).   
226  See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 815.20 (2005) (providing that homestead exemption does not apply to 
mortgages).  
227  See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (2000) (including employment among permis-
sible purposes for furnishing of credit reports); id. § 1681k (listing requirements relating to public record 
information for employment-related inquiries); id. § 1681c (specifying length of time for reporting nota-
tion); see also Spence v. TRW, Inc., 92 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 1996) (credit reporting challenge).  Congress 
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providers regularly participate in this system,228 although their participation 
surely pales in comparison with the submission of delinquency information 
by consumer lenders.229  Some observers have speculated that medical debt 
owed to providers has a lesser credit rating impact than ordinary consumer 
loans.230  Even so, the notations relating to medical debts may affect a sub-
stantial number of credit scores,231 although again, not nearly to the extent 
of late payments or defaults on ordinary consumer credit.   
Overall, the debtor-creditor system contemplates that creditors—which 
is what hospitals are considered under our health care system—will engage 
in informal collection (including frequent phone calls), formal collection 
(including lawsuits and liens), credit reporting participation when their 
debtors fail to pay, or any combination of these tactics. 
C. Summary 
This brief tour through liability and debt collection offers a framework 
for evaluating the claim that hospitals misbehave when they collect the 
debts owed to them.  Medical debt collection is the consequence of the 
structure of our health care finance and debtor-creditor systems, not simply 
                                                                                                                           
recently reauthorized the Fair Credit Reporting Act.  See Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat 1952.   
228  Federal Reserve economists estimate that medical bills account for 18.2% of court judgments on 
credit reports, and 52.2% of collection agency actions reported to credit bureaus.  See Robert B. Avery 
et al., An Overview of Consumer Data and Credit Reporting, 89 FED. RES. BULL. 47, 67, 69 (2003); see 
also COLLINS ET AL., supra note 105, at 17–19 (reporting on percentage of adults being contacted by 
collection agencies or having other medical bill problems).   
229  Most of the components of a credit score and credit report relate to trade lines of credit, the hold-
ers of which regularly report loan, repayment, and delinquency information to credit bureaus.  See My-
Fico, What’s in Your Credit Report, http://www.myfico.com/CreditEducation/InYourReport.aspx? 
fire=5 (last visited Jan. 2, 2006).  According to Fair Isaac, the credit scoring firm, the average consumer 
has thirteen credit obligations on a credit report, including various types of credit and charge cards and 
installment loans reported by lenders.  See MyFico, Average Credit Statistics, http://www.myfico.com/ 
CreditEducation/AverageStats.aspx (last visited Jan. 2, 2006).  
230  See, e.g., Hearing on Hospital Billing and Collections, supra note 28, at 111 (written statement 
of Jack Bovender, Hospital Corp. of America) (“I have been told by people who do credit scoring and 
are in this type of business that hospital debt is not viewed at the same level as mortgages and car pay-
ments.”).  
231  Federal Reserve economists estimate that medical-related collection agency actions affect the 
credit scores of 15% of the general population and 51.6% of the low credit score population.  Among 
those for whom eliminating the impact of medical debt collections raised the score, the average increase 
was 11.2 points for the general population, 8 points for the low-credit-score population, and 16.6 points 
for the high-credit-score population.  Among those for whom eliminating the impact of medical debt 
collections decreased the score, the average decrease was 5.9 points for the general population, 2.7 
points for the low-credit-score population, and 6.8 points for the high-credit-score population.  See 
Robert B. Avery, Paul S. Calem & Glenn B. Canner, Credit Report Accuracy and Access to Credit, 90 
FED. RES. BULL. 297, 314 tbl.3, 316 tbl.4 (2004).  The credit score is “not only a respected estimate of a 
credit report’s implied creditworthiness, it is the implied creditworthiness for some purposes.”  David K. 
Musto,  What Happens When Information Leaves a Market?:  Evidence from Postbankruptcy Consum-
ers, 77 J. BUS. 725, 730 (2004).    
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the manifestation of a provider’s misbehavior.  Most patients bear some 
self-pay liability, and this will be the case even if hospitals properly imple-
ment reasonably generous charity care and discount policies.  By and large, 
hospitals are engaging in activities and practices recognized as part of our 
system of contract and related liability enforcement.  If those practices are 
shocking, inefficient, or otherwise inappropriate, they should be banned re-
gardless of whether they are undertaken by Citibank or City Hospital.  
To sustain the claim that hospitals should be singled out among con-
sumer creditors for their collection activities, it is necessary to show that 
there is something special about what hospitals do.  There is no doubt that 
they may have overreached in certain instances, in much the same way as 
other kinds of creditors have done from time to time.232  But current debtor-
creditor law is reasonably lenient with respect to the creation of legally 
binding obligations and the use of informal and formal mechanisms to col-
lect those amounts.  Our system tolerates relatively aggressive attempts to 
pressure individual debtors to pay.  Medical debt collection has the poten-
tial to exacerbate the trouble for people already struggling with illness or in-
jury, but this issue is distinct from whether hospitals misbehave when they 
engage in standard forms of collection available to all creditors.  
It would be possible to develop additional arguments that hospitals are 
using their debt collection powers differently than other providers and 
creditors, but such arguments would require more empirical support.  For 
 
232  For example, we have concerns about the use of body attachments, bench warrants, or courts’ 
contempt power as a debt collection practice.  See source cited supra note 17.  Formally, imprisonment 
in these contexts is for failure to abide by a court order (such as an order to appear in court) because im-
prisonment for debt has long been prohibited in most contexts.  See William J. Woodward, Jr., New 
Judgment Liens on Personal Property:  Does “Efficient” Mean “Better”?, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 42–
43 (1990) (“[T]he legal system seldom imposes criminal sanctions on debtors.”); Becky A. Vogt, Note, 
State v. Allison:  Imprisonment for Debt in South Dakota, 46 S.D. L. REV. 334, 347 (2001) (reviewing 
federal and state abolition of imprisonment for indebtedness).  Functionally, this approach wields the 
tremendous leverage of restricting personal freedom in order to collect debts.  See 1 Edward C. Dolan, 
Collection of Contract Debts, in PRACTICE MANUAL FOR THE MARYLAND LAWYER S-35, S-36 (3d ed. 
2002) (“[B]ody attachments are usually rather effective, as most debtors do not like to be imprisoned 
and suddenly find funds.”); Karen I. Englehardt, Guide to Collection Procedures in Federal Court, 16 
CHIC. BAR ASS’N REC. 34, 36–37 (2002) (“If the witness does not attend that hearing, you should ask 
the court to enter a body attachment, the process where the U.S. Marshal’s Service will arrest and bring 
the witness to the Judge.”).  Some hospital executives testified under oath that they now prohibit their 
debt collectors from using bench warrants.  See Hearing on Hospital Billing and Collections, supra note 
28, at 89 (written statement of Kevin Lofton, Catholic Health Initiatives) (stating that new contracts with 
collectors prohibit bench warrants); id. at 293 (stating that Ascension Health’s new policy prohibits 
bench warrants).  Individual hospitals may have attempted to overreach in other related and distinct 
ways, but this is not limited to the last few years.  See, e.g., Cmty. Hosp. of Roanoke Valley, Inc. v. 
Musser (In re Musser), 24 B.R. 913 (W.D. Va. 1982) (involving a hospital forcing family to sign (unen-
forceable) waiver of homestead exemption following serious accident); County of Santa Clara v. Var-
gas, 139 Cal. Rptr. 537 (Ct. App. 1977) (permitting continuation of lawsuit against deceased patient’s 
spouse due to statute of limitations waiver); Turnboo v. County of Santa Clara, 301 P.2d 992 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1956) (upholding waiver of statute of limitations); Bedard v. Notre Dame Hosp., 151 A.2d 690 
(R.I. 1959) (involving plaintiff’s allegation that hospital refused to release two-year-old son). 
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example, perhaps systematic research would uncover that hospitals are 
categorically more aggressive in collection than other kinds of creditors.  Or 
perhaps studies would find that hospitals direct their collection efforts to-
ward debtors who are much less likely to be able to pay for the sole purpose 
of deterring their attempts to get health care at all.  These would be impor-
tant research questions for both health policy and debtor-creditor policy and 
are questions we hope to pursue in future years.  Depending on the findings, 
such research potentially could help justify the misbehavior label and the 
pursuit of a more targeted response.  At this point, however, the evidence 
has not been presented.    
Others may argue that not-for-profit or religious hospitals have special 
obligations to refrain from engaging in collection activities even in the ab-
sence of this kind of data.233  We would be surprised by a broad claim that 
debt collection is off limits for all entities with tax-exempt status—
including credit unions, universities, and most of the nation’s hospitals.234  If 
anything, we suspect some of them have a rather strong need to try to col-
lect what they are owed.235  Nonetheless, if the goal is to preclude not-for-
profit or religious hospitals from engaging in debt collection, then it may 
make sense to reconsider debt collection entitlements more broadly.  Those 
who have studied the debtor-creditor system have long worried about the 
impact of indebtedness and debt collection.236  If the motivating concern is 
protection of individuals—as opposed to promoting a more palatable con-
ception of “charitable” institutions—then the analysis is more effective if it 
is shifted to a patient/debtor-centered or tactic-based approach to the prob-
lem rather than focusing on the identity and “wrongdoing” of particular 
types of creditors.  We return to this issue in Part V. 
V. IMPLICATIONS, PROPOSALS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
News media reports, the work of advocate groups, and the responses of 
lawmakers have made the public more aware that medical problems can fi-
nancially devastate people of modest means and that aggressive debt collec-
tion exacerbates the impact of our chosen health care finance system.  We 
applaud those who have surfaced this issue.  Without them, the stories 
would remain largely in the shadows.  But the responses to these revelations 
are heading in the wrong direction.  They take the form of proposals nar-
 
233  See, e.g., Benjamin & Gabriesheski, supra note 159. 
234  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 114, at 111 tbl.157; Greaney & 
Boozang, supra note 58, at 3.   
235  See generally Greaney & Boozang, supra note 58, at 39 (discussing application of corporate du-
ties and law to nonprofits, and noting that fiduciaries in nonprofit setting have special duty to protect 
assets); Kelley, supra note 54.  
236  See, e.g., DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE:  A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 288 
(1974) (concluding that “the current system of resolving disputes between creditors and debtors is far 
too costly both to the debtors and to society at large”).  See generally Melissa B. Jacoby, Does Indebted-
ness Influence Health?:  A Preliminary Inquiry, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 560, 564–67 (2002). 
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rowly targeted toward making hospitals behave differently rather than tak-
ing a critical look at the structure of the health care finance system that 
makes it inevitable that this activity will occur.  In this Part, we briefly 
identify some implications of our analysis.  
Judging by the advocacy groups’ interest in the hospital misbehavior 
model, we assume they believe that some low-income uninsured people will 
benefit from this approach in the short term.237  In a world in which little 
progress is made to solve health care finance problems, the possibility of 
some advancement for this group may seem attractive.  But hospitals have 
limited capacity to provide enduring answers.  They cannot finance the 
health care of the uninsured even if they spend every dollar of the value of 
their tax exemptions.238  They already collect far less than the full amount 
from self-pay patients.239  Expecting hospitals to absorb the cost of treating 
uninsured patients may contribute to a reduction of the number of services 
available to all patients, which of course would be counterproductive.240   
 
237  See, e.g., Hearing on Hospital Billing and Collections, supra note 28, at 33–37 (written state-
ment of Mark Rukavina, The Access Project); PATIENT FRIENDLY BILLING PROJECT, supra note 48, at 
14 (explaining types of payment plans that surveyed hospitals are implementing). 
238  See Noble et al., supra note 30 (charity hospitals); Elizabeth K. Keating et al., Assessing Finan-
cial Vulnerability in the Nonprofit Sector (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Faculty Research Working 
Paper No. RWP05-002, 2005) (nonprofit hospitals). 
239  See, e.g., Prottas, supra note 109 (“Hospitals’ bad debt collections are very low—estimates gen-
erally range from 7% to 10% . . . .  Charging the uninsured more than the insured gains hospitals . . . vir-
tually no revenue.”); Hearing on Hospital Billing and Collections, supra note 28, at 94 (written 
statement of Jack Bovender, Hospital Corp. of America) (reporting that HCA treated one million unin-
sured patients in the previous year, that they contributed less than one percent to HCA’s net revenues, 
and that HCA lost half a billion dollars in unreimbursed costs); id. at 100 (June 24, 2004) (written state-
ment of Herbert Pardes, New York Presbyterian Hospital) (reporting that the hospital collects twelve to 
thirteen percent of the charges for services from self-pay patients, with write-offs approaching $70 mil-
lion per year). 
240  See Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector:  The Behavior, Law, and Ethics of 
Not-For-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1345, 1405–07 (2003); Noble et al., supra note 30.  But see 
Greaney & Boozang, supra note 58, at 6 (noting competing evidence on whether not-for-profit hospitals 
provide benefits justifying special treatment).  See also Hearing on Hospital Billing and Collections, 
supra note 28, at 94 (written statement of Jack Bovender, Hospital Corp. of America) (reporting on how 
full service facilities are left caring for uninsured while physician-owned limited care hospitals take 
profitable services for low risk patients); SCHUMACHER GROUP, 2004 HOSPITAL EMERGENCY 
DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATION SURVEY (2004) (on file with authors) (using 2003 data and reporting 
that 33% of respondents who lost specialty coverage reported that uncompensated care discouraged spe-
cialists from providing coverage, 20% reported reimbursement for services as the top concern or priority 
facing the department in the next twelve months, 77% reported that their emergency department was a 
major provider of primary care for the indigent or uninsured in the community, 39% reported that pa-
tients sometimes have to wait more than two hours to receive care, and 9% reported patients often had to 
wait more than two hours).  Hospitals have raised the question of whether the pressure to provide larger 
write-offs will restrict the services that employers and insurers are willing to cover.  PATIENT FRIENDLY 
BILLING PROJECT, supra note 48, at 6–7.  Although their point may be self-serving, their question accu-
rately reflects the impossibility of hospitals solving even hospital-specific problems on their own.  A 
wider range of parties must tackle the structural factors. 
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In addition, even if lawmakers implement misbehavior-driven re-
sponses with full hospital compliance, the type of problems that received 
front-page treatment will not subside because their structural determinants 
will continue to exist; the problems will simply receive less attention.  
Families will lose homes due to foreclosure of mortgages incurred to fi-
nance major health expenses.  Insured families will be dunned by hospitals 
or credit card lenders for big co-pays and deductibles.  Middle-aged couples 
will drain assets intended to fund retirement in order to keep their short-
term finances together after a major health crisis.  Medical problems will 
hinder the ability of people to work.  Parents will struggle to take care of se-
riously ill children, and adult children will struggle to take care of aging 
parents.  To curb costs, some patients may underuse prescribed medication 
or deny themselves needed medical care.241  In the meantime, worrying 
about medical-related financial distress may exacerbate health problems.242  
Hospitals can neither bear all the blame nor shoulder the entire burden.   
In an ideal world, policymakers would identify the full range of finan-
cial problems faced by individuals and their families in the aftermath of se-
rious illness or injury and would undertake a comprehensive study of the 
aspects of our health care finance system—broadly construed—that con-
tribute to these problems.  Medical and public health researchers are search-
ing for mechanisms to measure the full economic impact of sickness on 
households around the world.243  Studies of health care issues in other na-
 
241  See, e.g., Hearing on Hospital Billing and Collections, supra note 28, at 53 chart 16 (written 
statement of Sara Collins, The Commonwealth Fund) (reporting on health care deprivations based on 
insurance status); Himmelstein et al., supra note 70, at W5-68 exhibit 4 (reporting privations experi-
enced by medical-related bankruptcy filers prior to filing); O’Toole et al., supra note 212, at 774 tbl.2 
(reporting that 67.4% of low-income patients surveyed reported medical debt or collection activity af-
fected subsequent care, including delay in seeking care or use of emergency room); see also Adrienne S. 
Kapel et al., Increasing Up-Front Collections, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Mar. 2004, at 82 (reporting 
that patients cancel appointments when doctors change payment policies). 
242  See J.H.J. Bankroft et al., The Reasons People Give for Taking Overdoses, 128 BRITISH J. 
PSYCHIATRY 538 (1968); Patricia Drentea, Age, Debt and Anxiety, 41 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 437 
(2000); Patricia Drentea & Paul J. Lavrakas, Over the Limit:  The Association Among Health, Race and 
Debt, 50 SOC. SCI. & MED. 517 (2000); Simon Hatcher, Debt and Deliberate Self Poisoning, 164 
BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY 111 (1994); Sarah Nettleton & Roger Burrows, When a Capital Investment Be-
comes an Emotional Loss:  The Health Consequences of the Experience of Mortgage Possession in Eng-
land, 15 HOUSING STUDS. 463 (2000).  For a literature review, see Jacoby, supra note 236.  But see 
Angela C. Lyons & Tansel Yilmazer, Health and Financial Strain:  Evidence from the Survey of Con-
sumer Finances, 71 S. ECON. J. 873 (finding that large financial burdens are unlikely to accelerate a de-
cline in financial status).   
243  See, e.g., Wenke Hwang et al., Out-of-Pocket Medical Spending for Care of Chronic Conditions, 
20 HEALTH AFF. 267 (2001); Ke Xu et al., Household Catastrophic Health Expenditure:  A Multicountry 
Analysis, 362 LANCET 111 (2003); Steven Russell, The Economic Burden of Illness for Households in 
Developing Countries:  A Review of Studies Focusing on Malaria, Tuberculosis, and Human Immunode-
ficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 7 AM. J. TROPICAL MED. HYGIENE 147 (2004) 
(showing indirect costs of illness as percentage of household income, and advocating for more complete 
measure of economic effects at household level); R. Sauerborn et al., Household Strategies to Cope with 
the Economic Costs of Illness, 43 SOC. SCI. & MED. 291 (1996); Eric J. Sherman et al., The Collection of 
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tions with very different economic and health profiles can prompt a rethink-
ing of the boundaries of health care finance in the United States.244   
Assuming, as we must, that legislators and policymakers inevitably 
prefer more incremental and narrowly targeted proposals, our empirical 
findings in Part III and legal discussion in Part IV nonetheless should shape 
the contours of such proposals.  For example, if legislators decide they can 
tackle no more than providing better protection for the chronically unin-
sured from large hospital bills, the proposals must revisit existing state laws 
that give hospitals special collection rights against low-income patients.  
They also should find a way to extend any proposed restrictions on hospi-
tals to third-party financers of medical bills; otherwise hospitals will have 
strong incentives to essentially require patients to incur third-party credit.245  
We hope that our exploration of this issue invites a debate on debtor-
creditor policy as well.  The hospital misbehavior model, properly contex-
tualized, raises the question whether debtor-creditor laws strike the right 
balance between enforcement of legal obligations and the protection of in-
dividuals.  For a long time, the law not only has given liberal recognition to 
the creation of legally binding debts, and given all types of creditors wide 
latitude in coaxing “voluntary” payments; it has required that taxpayers 
subsidize debt collection activities against individuals and families of mod-
est means.246  Stories of embarrassing and value-reducing debt collection ac-
tivities rarely enter into the public discourse.  The media’s hospital 
misbehavior stories have thrown standard debt collection practices into 
                                                                                                                           
Indirect and Nonmedical Direct Costs (COIN) Form:  A New Tool for Collecting the Invisible Costs of 
Androgen Independent Prostate Carcinoma, 91 CANCER 841 (2000); Hugh R. Waters et al., Measuring 
Financial Protection in Health in the United States, 69 HEALTH POL’Y 339 (2004). 
244  See, e.g., Jane Falkingham, Poverty, Out-of-Pocket Payments and Access to Health Care:  Evi-
dence from Tajikistan, 58 SOC. SCI. & MED. 247 (2003); Paul Gertler & Jonathan Gruber, Insuring Con-
sumption Against Illness, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 51 (2002) (Indonesia); Michael Kent Ranson, Reduction 
of Catastrophic Health Care Expenditures by a Community-Based Health Insurance Scheme in Gujarat, 
India:  Current Experiences and Challenges, 80 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 613, 615 (2002) (studying 
impact of community insurance schemes on medical debt); Steven Russell, Ability to Pay for Health 
Care:  Concepts and Evidence, 11 HEALTH POL’Y & PLANNING 219 (1996); Sauerborn et al., supra note 
243 (seeking greater emphasis on time costs of caring and intrahousehold transfers); M. Segal et al., 
Economic Transition Should Come with a Health Warning:  The Case of Vietnam, 56 J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL COMMUNITY HEALTH 497 (2002); Wim Van Damme et al., Out-of-Pocket Health 
Expenditures and Debt in Poor Households:  Evidence from Cambodia, 9 TROPICAL MED. & INT’L 
HEALTH 273 (2004); Oxford Health Alliance Working Group, The Economic Consequences of Health 
Shocks (World Bank Dev. Research Group, Working Paper No. 3644, 2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=757386 (Vietnam). 
245  Including private lenders in medical debt collection restrictions admittedly is a much more com-
plex and controversial undertaking.  Particularly with respect to multipurpose revolving credit, debt in-
curred for a hospital stay quickly becomes entangled with credit extended for food, clothing, and other 
expenditures, not to mention compounding interest and fees.  Studies of the purpose of home equity 
loans show that medical expenses are often lumped together with other household needs.  
246  See Whitford, supra note 163. 
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sharp relief, and possibly have set the stage for reexamination of the long-
accepted status quo.    
The hospital misbehavior model may offer some short-term benefits 
for the low-income uninsured, and it has shamed some hospitals into reex-
amining certain aggressive practices.  The focus on behavior, though, only 
superficially captures the entanglement between the health care system and 
the debtor-creditor system.  To make meaningful inroads into the pervasive 
problem of medical-related financial distress, a much broader structural in-
quiry is in order.     
 
 
